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THE EMERGENT EUROPEAN EDUCATIONAL POLICIES UNDER SCRUTINY. THE BOLOGNA PROCESS FROM A CENTRAL EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

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1. THE “EUROPEAN HIGHER EDUCATION AREA” AND THE “EUROPEAN RESEARCH AREA”: THE “EUROPE OF KNOWLEDGE” REVISITED

FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES OF BOTH PROJECTS

It may be very useful for the present analysis to view the Bologna process of creating the European Higher Education Area in the context of the simultaneous, gradual emergence of the European Research Area as part of the implementation of the so-called Lisbon agenda of the European Union. Taking into account both the traditional Humboldtian idea of the inseparable dyad of teaching and research and current functioning of the university sector in Europe, it may turn out to be quite enlightening to view the two processes as the two sides of the same coin: that of the redefinition of the roles, missions, tasks, and obligations of the institution of the university in rapidly changing and increasingly market-driven and knowledge-based European economies. Both teaching and research are undergoing substantial transformations today and the institution of the university that until fairly recently had been almost exclusive in hosting the two interrelated activities in all probability will not be able to avoid the process of substantial, partly planned and partly chaotic, transformation of its functioning.

Both projects will have far-reaching (and still not fully clear) consequences for all the stakeholders. Both of them are evolving and are still not clearly defined: there are no explicit definitions of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) and the European Research Area (ERA) available in official documents today. All we can do is to try to distill evolving quasi-definitions from subsequent documents, working papers, and communiqués. One thing is clear, though: we are confronting a major redesign of what research and teaching in European public sector are supposed to be, of how public higher education institutions, including universities, are supposed to function and be financed (at least from EU funds), and what roles students and faculty are pressed to assume in European higher education systems. At the moment, the EHEA is much more of a desired ideal to be achieved, with very limited funding available for its implementation in particular countries; the ideal of the ERA, by contrast, has already determined the shape of the 6th Framework Programme of Research – the biggest source of EU research funds, totaling 17.5 billion EUR for 2002-2006 – and ways in which research activities in Europe are currently funded from EU sources. Thus while the effects of the ideal of the EHEA still remain largely at the level of governmental good wishes about the direction of changes of particular national higher education systems in the coming years, the effects of the ideal of the ERA are already visible at the practical level of where clusters of research funds are channeled to and what new instruments are available (the most recent instruments being so-called networks of excellence and integrated projects as well as a wide spectrum of mobility tools within the Marie Curie Fellowship schemes). The European Research Area is an operational component of a comprehensive Lisbon agenda agreed on in 2000 which aims at redefining both European economy, welfare and education systems by 2010.
THE AGGRESSIVE PROMOTION AND THE CONVERGENCE BETWEEN INTERGOVERNMENTAL, INTERINSTITUTIONAL AND EUROPEAN LEVELS

Whatever view we share on the two parallel processes, they are already relatively well advanced in some countries and quite aggressively promoted all over Europe, including Central and East European accession countries and the Balkans (called here most often, for the sake of brevity, the “transition countries” or “the Region”). While the effects of the ERA are basically restricted to the beneficiaries of research funds available from the EU, the Bologna process may potentially influence the course of reforming national higher education systems in 40 countries. It is interesting to note which countries were involved in the process from the very beginning and which were subsequently willing and able to join it: while the Sorbonne Declaration (1998) was signed by ministers of education of the four biggest EU countries – France, Italy, United Kingdom, and Germany, the Bologna Declaration (1999) was signed already by ministers from 29 countries, and at the Berlin conference in September 2003 the following newcomers were accepted: Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Holy See, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Some may call the process a really European integration of various higher education systems, regardless of their huge differences; official documents usually refer to the “diversity” of countries and institutions involved – but one thing is certain: the Bologna process in its present geographical, economic and political composition faces a tremendous challenge of keeping a single pace of changes for all countries involved. Judging from the experience of well over a decade of social and economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, to keep the process going at one speed is like mission impossible; most probably, in the coming years, further developments of the process will require separate tracks accompanied by descriptions of the most required parts of reforms, separate descriptions of challenges and, most importantly, separate sets of policy recommendations for clusters of countries implementing reforms at different paces – if it is not going to be a purely theoretical exercise in numerous countries of the Region.

Even though there were separate tracks in thinking about the EHEA and ERA, there has been clear convergence between them recently (the Magna Charta Universitatum signed in Bologna 1988 by rectors of European universities initiated the track of higher education institutions, with the Salamanca and Graz Conventions in 2001 and 2003; Sorbonne – Bologna – Prague and Berlin meetings have been all on the track of national ministers of education/governments; and the last track was that of the EU level and consisted of subsequent EU communiqués and other documents, from the first Towards a European Research Area of 2000 to the two most recent: The Role of Universities in the Europe of Knowledge and Researchers in the European Research Area: One Profession, Multiple Careers, both of 2003. Recently, the supranational, intergovernmental and inter-institutional levels are being increasingly mixed. (To give an example from the Berlin summit: the follow-up group of the Bologna process will be chaired by the EU Presidency, with the host country of the next conference (Norway) as vice-chair; a newly created Board will also be chaired by the EU Presidency. At the same time both reports on the implementation of the Bologna process presented in Berlin – Trends III by Sybille Reichert and Christian Tauch and Bologna Process Between Prague and Berlin by Pavel Zgaga – were funded by the European Commission. Also from the very beginning, Association of European Universities (CRE) and then the European University Association (EUA) took an active part in the process, especially being responsible for organizing all official Bologna follow-up seminars). Pavel Zgaga stresses that in the light of EU enlargement, the convergence between the Bologna process and EU educational policy-making will be even more visible(Zgaga 2003: 7).
As Marijk van der Wende discussing Lisbon and Bologna, or “cities that matter in European higher education policies”, remarked recently,

at this point the Bologna and the Lisbon processes are occurring in parallel. They show an interesting degree of overlap in rationales, objectives, and methods; and further convergence between the two may be expected. Still, there are also meaningful differences between the processes. First, the fact that the Bologna process was undertaken bottom-up and the Lisbon process is being led directly by the commission has implications in terms of perceived ownership. Second, there are differences in terms of the mode of multilevel governance these processes represent. Third, throughout the various periods, the EU’s main rationale for action has remained an economic one, which is again clearly visible in the Lisbon process. And although the broad motivations and objectives of the Bologna and Lisbon processes may be rather similar, the two processes may diverge with respect to this point, given the increased focus on the social dimensions and related public-good arguments in the Bologna process. Fifth, differences also exist with respect to the involvement of actors … and in the range of countries involved. Finally, the role of the European Union has moved beyond mobility and recognition issues into the policy field at large (van der Wende 2003: 17-18).

ACADEMICS, BOLOGNA, AND THE THREAT OF THE EXERCISES BECOMING “THEORETICAL”

The European Commission, European governments and the vast majority of rector’s of European higher education institutions see determined to implement the ideas agreed on during subsequent ministerial summits and called for short the Bologna process. (Apart from the official tracks of the Bologna process, the new space of European educational policies includes an accompanying invisible interactions between small groups of linked professionals, managers, and experts. As Martin Lawn and Bob Lingard formulate it (echoing some voices about the lack of clear responsibilities in the process), “this space does not have a constitutional position, a legislative legality, a fixed place of work or a regulated civic or business mission. Yet it is being formed between state and EU offices, between agencies and subcontractors, between academics and policy managers, between experts and officials, and between voluntary and public sector workers. ... It is shaped by the opportunities and fears of globalisation” (Lawn and Lingard 2002: 291). The least interest and determination is shown by the academic profession, though – not by those who do the administration of teaching and research at various levels of governance (from particular national institutions to the European Commission) but by those who are directly involved in the two. As Trends III report formulated the issue:

four years have passed since the Bologna Declaration and it seems that the Bologna Process is now viewed by a majority of higher education representatives in most European countries as a reform agenda which cannot be ignored, but which should be dealt with proactively if universities are not to be overtaken by unwanted interpretations of what Bologna should mean at institutional level. The ongoing challenge faced by participants in the process, be they enthusiasts or skeptics, is to make sense of the Bologna objectives in each institutional context (Reichert and Tauch 2003:25, emphasis mine).

The “institutional context” in question is each higher education institution in each of the signatory countries – with its students and its faculty. As the report puts it expressis verbis, “deliberations on the implementation of Bologna reforms currently involve heads of
institutions more than academics. Hence, interpreting Bologna in the light of its goals and the whole context of its objectives at departmental level, i.e. rethinking current teaching structures, units, methods, evaluation and the permeability between disciplines and institutions, is a task that still lies ahead for a majority of academics at European universities” (Reichert and Tauch 2003: 9). Consequently, it seems that the actors most directly involved in the actual implementation of the Bologna ideas in the future are still mostly unaware of its consequences or unwilling to discuss them in more detail. But without clear support both for the general reform agenda and for the details of implementation that go down to the level of each department on the part of the academic faculty (as complementary to ministers and rectors), the Bologna process will fail, especially in the countries other than current EU-15. There is quite a chance that the whole process will be put at a halt if the academic profession is not convinced of new opportunities it provides, and is not supported by new incentives. On the other hand, I have to agree with Albert Amaral and António Magalhaes’s warning signal that “if the Bologna’s convergence process gets out of control of academics and becomes a feud of European bureaucracy, then one may well see a process of homogenization, and this represents another factor endangering the traditional role of the European universities” (Amaral and Magalhaes 2002: 9). The Bologna process may turn in the Region to be an interesting intellectual endeavor – a theoretical exercise. (Which, by the way, is the conclusion about the accession countries of a 2002 communiqué of the European Commission about the progress of the implementation of the ERA, The European Research Area: Providing New Momentum: “the integration of the Candidate Countries into the constitution of the European Research Area remains at a rather theoretical level” (European Commission 2002a: 21, emphasis mine). Being a social philosopher and public policy analyst, I am surely not in general against theoretical exercises; but in these cases, the two parallel processes of creating common European higher education area and common European research area, the exercises in “core” European countries are not theoretical at all: we are talking about the rechanelling of European research funds, changing research and development policies, as well as the recognition of diplomas for educational and professional purposes, mobility for academic and professional purposes on the increasingly integrated European labor market. We are talking about those who are in it (and may be winners) and those who are potentially out of it (and may be losers), especially as far as EU funding for research activities (as a consequence of the emergence of the ERA) are concerned. As Guy Neave put it in his thought-provoking paper on the European integration in higher education, “the ‘Bologna process’ has now reached the stage when principles begin to assume institutional form” (Neave 2001a: 2). What he meant, I believe, was that it had been high time to review thoroughly the Bologna process before practical decisions concerning our institutions, students and faculty, are made. We shall return to the complex issue of the relations between the Bologna process and the emergence of the European Research Area in more detail below.

**OTHER ISSUES OF INTEREST – A WIDER CONTEXT FOR BOLOGNA**

The Bologna process can be reviewed in a multitude of contexts, the emergence of the European Research Area being the most natural one. It may thus be very useful to make a short analysis of the official documents accompanying the Bologna process and the creation of the ERA to see the trajectory of changes in emphases of particular problems and issues, subsequent downplaying some motifs and making use of others previously absent, as well as the “division of labor” between representatives of higher education institutions and university rectors, national ministries of education, and the European Commission as reflected in documents produced so far.
To invoke some of the conclusions in advance, over the last years the vocabulary used by the different parties involved in the two processes has become increasingly similar; the visions of the future of our universities have become more convergent than ever before; and the more or less tacit agreement on different speeds at which different parts of Europe and their higher education institutions will be changing their educational and research and development landscapes is becoming increasingly clear. Thus it may be useful to discuss here what is promoted and what is omitted in subsequent documents; where new emphases go and what new issues appear on the level of theory; what practical steps accompany both theoretical statements in various parts of Europe (EHEA) and changing research and development policies at the European level (ERA).

Another interesting issue is to try to analyze the ideals of the university brought about, either tacitly or explicitly, by both processes but especially by the Bologna process: what are the visions of the future of the university in the integrated Europe? What does the “Europe of Knowledge” mean for higher education institutions, and for the universities in particular, and how universities are to be viewed in the “knowledge-based economy” (by the way, the term “knowledge-based economy” was apparently first defined in 1996 in OECD’s book under this title; the definition runs as follows: “the term ‘knowledge-based economy’ results from a fuller recognition of the role of knowledge and technology in economic growth. Knowledge, as embodied in human beings (as ‘human capital’) and in technology, has always been central to economic development. But only over the last few years has its relative importance been recognized, just as that importance is growing. The OECD economies are more strongly dependent on the production, distribution and use of knowledge than ever before” (OECD 1996: 9; see Peters 2001, 2003; Delanty 2001). Where did new ideals of the university come from, who promotes them most and what the impact on the academic landscape they may have, especially in the Region? Who or what will determine the future social, cultural, economic and political roles of the universities in Europe, and on what grounds (see Sadlak 2000)? Is the Bologna process irreversible and what its (possible) failure in the Region (for instance, its purely theoretical dimension at the level of institutions accompanied by legislative changes at national levels) may mean? What are direct consequences of the Bologna process on the academic profession (for a context, see Enders 2000, Altbach 2000, Kwiek 2003b)?

Another cluster of interesting issues concerns the Bologna process viewed from a more global perspective: what is the relation between the process and global trends, especially those observed in most advanced OECD countries outside of Europe and caused by what can be labeled for short as “globalization”; what are global theoretical developments in thinking about national higher education systems, their regional integrations and their internationalization as conceptualized by supranational organizations; what are theoretical developments in thinking about future transformations of higher education systems in developing and transition countries as conceptualized by both supranational organizations and development agencies (thinking of such countries involved in the Bologna process as Russia or some Balkan countries).

It is interesting to note that major global institutions concerned with (inter alia) higher education reforms have so far (with a few small exceptions) largely ignored the European developments, as if being uncertain of their outcomes and quite certain of their highly political entourage provided by the spirit of the “European integration”. It would be very interesting indeed, although it is still not possible, to review the response to the Bologna
process when it is provided by OECD and the World Bank as well as by representatives of the European and non-European business sector (especially multinational corporations). Consequently, in the absence of direct responses of the global and international organizations to the Bologna process, it may prove fairly useful to compare briefly the visions of the future of the university as presented by different European actors (the Bologna process, European Commission, Council of Europe etc) with those recently presented by both OECD and the World Bank. How do these global visions relate to Europe? How do they capture ongoing transformations, global and European challenges, but also opportunities, provided by globalization processes and the passage to the “knowledge-based economies” (and societies) in the most affluent countries? Do “European” accounts of the future of the university hold for both EU countries and accession countries (accompanied by actually developing signatory countries of the Bologna process)?

As the direction of transformations of higher education on a global scale – and viewed from a comparative perspective – is quite well known, and quite widely studied (see van der Wende 2002; Kwiek 2001c; Enders 2002c; de Boer 2002), it is also interesting to juxtapose the most fundamental points of global readings of current situation of higher education systems and their future changes with distinctly European accounts of them. As the USA are constantly present as reference points in both EHEA and ERA initiatives, in most main documents and accompanying working papers and reports, and European data are constantly viewed against the American background, it is useful to go beyond mere competition in numbers between Europe and the USA (percentage of GDP going for higher education and for research and development, share of private investments in both higher education and research, levels of enrollments, total number of patents, researchers, PhDs etc) and revisit briefly American visions of the future of the university, both in the USA, in transition countries and on a global scale. Consequently, I am also interested here in learning what we Europeans are unable to see in current global transformations of higher education (but what can be seen from a global perspective) and in particular what we Central and East Europeans can learn from both, and use for our own purposes.

GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND THE REFORM ON PAPER?

On reading documents and reports, it appears that the Bologna process in its present form is relatively closed to global developments in higher education: it is largely inward-looking, focused mostly on Europe and its concerns, on European regional problems and European regional solutions, in the relative absence of references to global changes in higher education and huge political and economic transformations underlying them (see Enders 2002c; Burbules and Torres 2000; Currie and Newson 1998).

There are many issues in which Bologna has been (sometimes until recently) quite uninterested, to mention GATS negotiations, the emerging private and for-profit sectors in higher education, the role of “borderless” education, the role of powerful market forces in higher education, clearly declining public funds which governments are able and willing to spend on higher education, differences in challenges between EU-15 and transition countries etc. Some recommendations provided by the Trends III report seem abstract (“theoretical”, to refer again to the word quite useful throughout the paper), especially with respect to increased levels of public funding, especially in the transition countries. I am going to provide a rough picture of new challenges (confronting both EU-15 and transition countries) and old challenges (confronting only transition countries) in higher education systems and see how they are treated in Bologna process documents (as well as in the ERA and its documents).
The general feeling one gets while reading both EHEA and ERA documents is that they treat about mostly homogeneous higher education and research structures with fairly similar problems and facing fairly similar challenges for the future. Despite numerous references to the diversity of systems, cultural and linguistic differences, varying degrees of the implementation of the process in various countries so far, it is hardly possible to read the Bologna documents as if referring to the same degree to Germany or France on the one hand, and Albania, Macedonia and Russia on the other, to give most striking examples. What level of generality in describing challenges and providing recommendations for actions is needed if they are to refer to the countries in question? Is it feasible? What do these contrasted national systems of higher education have in common the moment we leave the most general level of analysis?

Certainly, almost anything can be done in these second tier countries on an official, especially legislative level. It may be relatively easy, compared with other planes of action, to change laws on higher education and the accompanying legal context, especially if the Bologna process arguments of catching up with the West are used for promotional purposes. Who from the Region, at least declaratively, would not like to be integrating with (West) European universities in common “areas”? But certainly changing laws is not the sole way to reach the objectives of the Bologna process although it may be understood in this way by many officials, especially on the governmental level. As Trends III summarized this attitude,

before Bologna, everyone knew that national higher education systems were indeed as different and incompatible as they looked. Bologna must avoid the risk of producing seemingly converging and compatible structures that could turn out to be, in spite of common terminology, just as irreconcilable as the old ones (Reichert and Tauch 2003: 73).

It is going to be a huge challenge for Bologna to avoid the reform on paper, to go beyond an efficient ministerial performance at the level of theory, especially to go beyond the national laws, in many transition countries.

THE INTERINSTITUTIONAL TRACK: THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY AND THE IMPACT OF BUDGET CUTS, OR HOW OUR VOCABULARIES CHANGE

The Magna Charta Universitatum (signed by European university rectors in Bologna in 1988) which precedes the Bologna process per se by a decade and is referred to in both the Bologna Declaration and the Salamanca Convention message, is a document from a different register than that of all later declarations and communiqués; it is general, very humanistic, and very vague indeed. It contains few details on how to proceed; but most of all, it is presented in the vocabulary of a pre-knowledge economy and pre-globalization era. Consequently, and not surprisingly, there are no mentions about globally competitive knowledge economies and societies, drivers of economic growth, more and better jobs, social cohesion and social exclusion/inclusion, external pressures on higher education, emerging market forces, changing European (or any other) labor market requirements, long-term risks for private investment in public research etc. Instead, there are some traditional ideas on universities’ roles and tasks. It is interesting to note how hard it is today to give a meaning to such statements as “centres of culture, knowledge and research” are “represented by true universities”. The idea that the university is an institution which “produces, examines,
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appraises and hands down culture by research and tradition” (Magna Charta 1988: 1, emphases mine) would find very few followers among promoters of either the ERA or the EHEA (a counterpoint in the new vocabulary comes to mind from EU Communiqué on the role of universities: “the knowledge society depends for its growth on the production of new knowledge, its transmission through education and training, its dissemination through information and communication technologies, and on its use through new industrial processes or services” (European Commission 2003b: 2), or from a World Bank framework policy paper on Constructing Knowledge Societies: “the ability of a society to produce, select, adapt, commercialize, and use knowledge is critical for sustained economic growth and improved living standards” (World Bank 2002: 7). The Magna Charta Universitatum today comes as a remembrance of things past. In the context of the ERA developments, it is hard to find the continuation of ideas about the university as an institution whose “constant care is to attain universal knowledge” and which is a “trustee of the European humanist tradition” in current discussions about the “Europe of Knowledge”. I presented this brief digression to show that it is no longer possible to talk about European integration of higher education and research as exemplified by the Bologna process and the ERA initiative in the language of the founders of modern German research university (Wilhelm von Humboldt, Schelling, Fichte, Schleiermacher and others) but also it is no longer possible to use solely the language used by rector’s of European universities 15 years ago. In fact it may be possible to talk and use the vocabulary used by them, but it may be much more difficult to be listened. The working vocabulary of the ERA, EHEA and global accounts of higher education and research (including UNESCO, OECD, and the World Bank) has changed enormously since 1988, and the shift in vocabulary merely underlies the shift in the ways we account for the roles and tasks of our educational institutions in society. As Guy Neave argues in his paper about “Universities’ Responsibility to Society”, “taken together, the direction on which privatization, de-regulation and accountability appear to be moving the university is without the slightest shadow of a doubt towards a new definition of its responsibilities. And perhaps the greatest of these new responsibilities is for each and every university individually to decide precisely how it will interpret this task” (Neave 2000: 23).

The next document along the track of academic institutions’ (rather than EU or governmental) declarations and responses is the Graz Declaration on the role of universities of 2003. It is a direct response to the EU communiqué on the subject. Generally, it shows how the emphases of the association of universities move away from The Magna Charta Universitatum and toward both EU (ERA) and governmental (Bologna) lines of thinking. Although the preamble sounds fairly traditional (cultivating European values and culture, European cultural and linguistic diversity, fostering a stronger civic society across Europe etc), as we move on in the text, the problems discussed are those of Bologna and ERA, with the same level of practicality. A good example is a new way of thinking about resources for universities: “universities should be encouraged to develop in different forms and to generate funds from a variety of sources. However, higher education remains first and foremost a public responsibility… “ (Graz Declaration 2003: 2). The shift in vocabulary is also significant, just to mention “negotiated contracts of sufficient duration to allow and support innovation” between governments and universities. It is interesting to note how the specificity of EU and governmental documents bring about new concepts and new level of specificity in university declarations. This brings about both good and bad consequences; good, as the two sides (knowledge and power, so to speak, and to use more traditional parlance) begin to talk about similar issues in similar language; bad, as the university begins to view its most sensitive issues from the perspective of power and its attributes, especially its potential funding opportunities. The balance between long- and short-term perspectives in thinking about
universities is currently certainly shaken; the moment the market vocabulary enters the
discourse on universities’ responsibilities towards the society, any long-term perspective is
hard to maintain on the part of the universities. Not surprisingly, in the final paragraphs about
“universities at the centre of reforms”, universities declare full support for changes but make
it implicitly conditional on acknowledging their current and future role. To quote it in extenso:

the Bologna process was initially politically driven. But it is now gaining momentum
because of the active and voluntary participation of all interested partners: higher
education institutions, governments, students and other stakeholders. Top down reforms
are not sufficient to reach the ambitious goals set for 2010. The main challenge is now to
ensure that reforms are fully integrated into core institutional functions and development
processes, to make them self-sustaining. Universities must have time to transform
legislative changes into meaningful academic aims and institutional realities. Governments and other stakeholders need to acknowledge the extent of institutional
innovation and the crucial contribution universities do an must make to the European
Research Area and the longer term-development of the European knowledge society as
outlined in the Lisbon declaration of the European Union. By united action, European
higher education – which now touches the lives of more than half the population of
Europe – can improve the entire continent (Graz Declaration 2003: 5)

I read the declaration in the following way: there will be no reforms without the support of
universities (to remind Clark Kerr’s oft-quoted saying: “Changing a university is difficult. It
is like moving a cemetery; hard work and there is no internal support”); universities need time
to introduce changes in each institution; they are eager to do this but the condition is that their
role in the ERA and, more generally, in emerging knowledge-based economies will be fully
acknowledged and adequately funded with public national (and EU) resources; united action
means that no more omissions on the part of EU about the role of universities (as exemplified
by the ERA communiqués between 2000 and 2003) should occur in the future. Thus power
and knowledge already seem to speak the same language; the time has come for mutual
guarantees for the future (by the way, I am not entirely sure that under present conditions
there is any other option possible in the long run, especially in the Region). As D. Bruce
Johnstone put it in his report for the UNESCO World Conference on Higher Education in
Paris in 1998, while describing radical change (or restructuring) of higher education
institutions, in the case of public universities, “the faculty have additional means with which
to resist threats of radical change and jobs loss: the idea of the university as a proper and
necessary bastion of continuity and tradition; the tradition of academic freedom; and the army
of students, former students and would-be students … Yet, while public universities resist
radical change, they are not immune to the loss of large amounts of public revenue occasioned
by the forces listed above” (Johnstone 1998: 19, emphasis mine). It may be concluded that
today, and maybe especially today, the struggle between the “idea of the university” with
possible cuts in financial support, including public support, is fought on very uneven terms
indeed. It is clear to all stakeholders, and that is one of the reasons of changes in the tone,
vocabulary and emphases in university declarations and communications between The Magna
Charta Universitatum of 1988 and today.

I would like to be able to agree with Pavel Zgaga when he states about the Bologna process
that “richness is the end; ‘common roads’ are the necessary means” (Zgaga 2003: 7) which
derives from the description of current situation in European higher education systems
according to which “there are national educational systems and curricula but there is also a
firm understanding that European cultural diversity gives us great advantages and richness”.

My (hopefully wrong) concern is that common roads are the means, and a common point of arrival (far away from richness and diversity) might be also the end.

GLOBAL TRENDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION, OR WHERE THE MARKET FORCES ARE NOT FORGOTTEN: A BRIEF REMINDER

The analysis underlying the Bologna process can be carried here in two directions: towards global changes in higher education as documented the world over and, more historically, towards the traditional models of modern university (of Wilhelm von Humboldt in Prussia and Napoleon in France, as well as towards the evolving Anglo-Saxon models, all of which “served as ‘templates’ for the development of higher education elsewhere in the world” (Neave 2000: 5, see Kwiek 2000, 2001a). The dominant model of the university in Central and Eastern Europe before the Second World War was the Humboldtian model, even though the “Napoleonic” model was also present, with Romania as a good example (Scott 2000: 345). It is interesting to see both how the EHEA draws from, and acts against, the traditional German model of the university (see Humboldt 1979; Fichte 1988, Schleiermacher 1991, Schelling 1966) as well as how the EHEA relates to global trends. Globally, the analyses of the changing role higher education, especially universities, in society and economy abound. Let us evoke briefly a few pictures to have a better point of departure for further discussions of EHEA and ERA initiatives.

Frank Newman, a chairman of an interesting “Futures Project. Policy for Higher Education in a Changing World” (based at Brown University) argues that universities, somehow unexpectedly, found themselves in real centers of social and economic developments as we entered the stage of knowledge-based economies. He claims that “most of us in higher education have wanted the public and policy makers to see higher education as a central force in the structure of society. To our surprise, they now do. This realization of higher education’s centrality has brought in its wake fascinating and demanding changes. … Quite suddenly, political and academic leaders have been alerted to changes in the nature of higher education. … Not needing the permission of either policy or academic leaders, market forces are beginning to transform how the system of higher education is structured” (Newman 2001a: 1). Consequently, systems of higher education are radically changing and becoming more competitive, more market- and student-oriented, and less regulated. As he describes the process,

the system of higher education, for the first time in any of our lives, is facing profound change. The forces bringing this change include the new technologies (both virtual and classroom), new providers of higher education (for profit and non-profit, virtual and traditional), new demographics and globalization. These forces already have considerable momentum. … Over the last five decades, higher education institutions have grown in number and size as well as in quality. But the academy has fiercely resisted any change in the basic structure of academic life – in the discipline, the department, the class, the major, the degree, and in the daily workings of academic life. These new forces, however, have changed the balance of power. For the first time, the structure of the academy is under assault. The forces of change and innovation are too strong to be resisted, even by institutions as skilled at giving status to the status quo as are we (Newman 1999:2).
How greater competition and market forces affect higher education globally? Despite different higher education traditions and structures, similar forces are affecting higher education in different countries. Both the institutions and policymakers are not ready for the changes that are coming. Universities find the advent of market forces jarring (like other institutions “used to a more stable and regulated world – telecommunications companies, power companies, or hospitals, for example” (Newman 1999b: 2-3). Finally, the author argues that “change is coming whether the institutions want it or not. Rather, the task is to help states steer the process so that effective, thoughtful change occurs” (Newman 1999c: 2).

What is the market attitude towards higher education in the US version? To give an extreme example along these lines of thinking, let us refer briefly to David W. Leslie and E.K. Fretwell, Jr. I believe it is very useful to draw clear distinctions between hard-liners in thinking about the role of the market in higher education like the authors, and those much more moderate, including US-based global organizations. It is useful to read Leslie and Fretwell to see how strongly their views differ from e.g. those offered in the World Bank policy reports. It is also useful to bear in mind that various ideas can be put in stronger and milder vocabularies, Leslie and Fretwell’s have certainly preferred stronger parlance. They argue, for instance, that colleges and universities are being tested on a marketplace. The fiscal problems they face, in our view, are directly related to whether they offer good value to the public. The claim can no longer be made that such institutions ‘deserve’ support because they have good reputations or big libraries or prestigious faculty. The inexorable changes we are now witnessing – both economically and politically – place the burden of proof directly on each college and university to show how and why it is worth supporting” (Leslie and Fretwell 1996: 26)

What is the social contract of the university with students and the broader society according to the two authors? It is “providing an attractive product at a fair price – giving society value for its money” (Leslie and Fretwell 1996: 26). Why do people study and how do they feel about “investing in education” from this perspective? “People buy and invest in higher education because they find some benefit in doing so. The only thing that higher education has to do, it seems, is sell its goods and services in the marketplace like other businesses” (Leslie and Fretwell 1996: 31). Consequently, “in the consumer’s mind, ‘added value’ means that the transaction is considered a favorable one” (Leslie and Fretwell 1996: 285). What higher education institutions should do? “The public will increasingly want assurance that students are getting good value for their money, and higher education will have to convince the public that they are getting that good value” (Leslie and Fretwell 1996: 286). Straightforward, simple, convincing – the moment we accept a purely market-oriented perspective. Forget about the missions of the modern universities, the shift of balance between the state and the market in higher education cannot be helped. What does it mean for the academic profession? “For most faculty … the appearance of fiscal crisis was a blow to their sense of living and working in an ordered and secure world” (Leslie and Fretwell 1996: 67); now they are entering the new era of uncertainty and insecurity…

Finally, according to D. Bruce Johnstone, Director of the International Comparative Higher Education Finance and Accessibility Project at the SUNY-Buffalo, we are currently witnessing “a shift in decision making power not just from government, but also from higher educational institutions – and especially form the faculty – to the consumer or client, whether student, business, or the general public” (Johnstone 1998: 4). What is especially relevant for some Central and East European countries is the argument that the environment for higher
education institutions was “the growing dissatisfaction in many countries with the rigidities and inefficiencies of the public sector generally, and a corresponding shift toward the market solutions … including privatization, deregulation, and decentralization of functions still considered ‘public’” (Johnstone 1998: 3). So conclusions about the 1990s in higher education is that there was a “remarkably consistent reform agenda”. The consistency means that there are very similar patterns in countries with dissimilar political-economic systems and higher education traditions, and at extremely dissimilar stages of industrial and technological development” (Johnstone 1998: 2).

The dominant theme in the 1990s has been “financial distress” and consequently the reform agenda was oriented towards the market. Johnstone argues that “underlying the market orientation of tertiary education is the ascendance, almost worldwide, of market capitalism and the principles of neo-liberal economics” (Johnstone 1998: 3). As far as cost sharing in higher education is concerned, Johnstone argues that “recent years have seen a dramatic, albeit uneven and still contested, shift in the burden of higher education costs from being borne predominantly by government, or taxpayers, to being shared with parents and students” (Johnstone 2003: 1). The already mentioned struggle between the “idea of the university” and cuts or increases of public and private revenues of the universities is going to be stronger. To sum up the American experience: “The transition is bound to be bumpy” (Newman 1999:2).

**Towards the European Research Area**

It is interesting to note that the first communiqué about the ERA published by the European Commission in 2000, *Towards a European Research Area*, hardly ever mentions universities on its 35 pages (actually the term is used three times or so in connection with the situation of research in North America). Higher education is not mentioned at all. On reading the document, it is clear from the very beginning that neither European universities nor European higher education in general have been significantly taken into account at the outset of thinking about common research space in Europe. What figures prominently instead are the dynamic private investment in research, intellectual property and effective tools to protect it, creation of companies and risk capital investment, research needed for political decision-making, more abundant and more mobile human resources or “a dynamic European landscape, open and attractive to researchers and investment” (European Commission 2000a: 18). It is symptomatic for the initial period of the ERA developments that while describing the situation of research in Europe, their traditional location at universities is not commented on. The opening paragraph of the paper states that even more so than the century that has just finished, the 21st century we are now entering will be the century of science and technology. More than ever, investing in research and technological development offers the most promise for the future. In Europe, however, the situation concerning research is worrying. Without concerted action to rectify this the current trend could lead to a loss of growth and competitiveness in an increasingly global economy. The leeway to be made up on the other technological powers in the world will grow still further. And Europe might not successfully achieve the transition to a knowledge-based economy. Why such a negative picture? (European Commission 2000a: 4)

The problem cruelly stated is that “the situation concerning research is worrying”. What are the main reasons for this, according to the communiqué? The principal reference framework for research activities in Europe is “national” and the static structure of “15+1” (Member
Marek Kwiek: The Emergent European Educational Policies Under Scrutiny. The Bologna Process from a Central European Perspective

States and the Union) leads to “fragmentation, isolation and compartmentalisation of national research efforts and systems” (European Commission 2000a: 7; see also Agalianos 2003: 184ff). There is no “European” policy on research, and “national research policies and Union policy overlap without forming a coherent whole”. What is needed is a “genuinely European research agenda” that will “go beyond filling the gaps of national research programmes to include concerns which are of a Europewide relevance and which will address a number of problems that contemporary European societies are faced with” (Agalianos 2002: 186). What is therefore needed is a “real European” research policy, a “more dynamic configuration” (European Commission 2000a: 7). As it was explained three years later,

the nature and scale of the challenges linked to the future of the universities mean that these issues have to be addressed at European [rather than national – MK] level (European Commission 2003b: 10).

It should come as no surprise that the initial reaction of the Confederation of EU Rectors’ Conference of May 2000 to the first ERA communiqué was more than reserved: “The Confederation finds it a source of concern that the central role of universities in research and training is not included in considerations concerning a European research area. Public research efforts which take place in universities are not recognized in the Communication. Not once are universities mentioned as places of research; not once are universities recognized as the institutions where the researchers of the future are being educated and trained; not once are universities represented as centres of national, regional or local acquisition and transfer of knowledge, nor is this function promoted” (EU Rectors’ Conference 2000: 1). The Confederation criticized the limited view of what constitutes “research”, the view that led to the downplaying of the role of universities in research activities. Research was limited to mean RTD only. It stressed the fact that universities are places where most public research takes place and by far most of basic research. Leaving out universities in discussions about ERA means “cutting out a very large part of the innovative and creative facets of research, as it means leaving out almost all basic research; and it means ignoring the education and training of future researchers” (EU Rectors’ Conference 2000: 2). As evidenced by further documents, especially following the communiqué on the role of universities, the reactions of the academic world to the ERA initiative were becoming much more favorable.

**THE EFFECT OF SYNERGY**

Documents of the European Commission devoted to the ERA rarely refer to the Bologna process but if they do, they do so in an approving manner: to give an example, as European higher education institutions are very diversified, “the structural reforms inspired by the Bologna process constitute an effort to organize that diversity within a more coherent and compatible European framework, which is a condition for the readability, and hence the competitiveness, of European universities both within Europe itself and in the whole world” (European Commission 2003b: 5). At the same time while EHEA documents refer to the ERA, the documents of the EU related to the “Lisbon agenda” clearly refer to the Bologna process (to give an example, *Presidency Conclusions. Barcelona European Council*: “The European Council calls for further action in this field: to introduce instruments to ensure the transparency of diplomas and qualifications (ECTS, diploma and certificate supplements, European CV) and closer cooperation with regard to university degrees in the context of the Sorbonne-Bologna-Prague process prior to the Berlin meeting in 2003” (Barcelona European Council 2002: art. 44). Finally, the Berlin communiqué calls emphatically the EHEA and the
ERA “two pillars of the knowledge based society”, mentions “synergies” between them and sends a clear message to institutions of higher education: “Ministers ask HEI [higher education institutions] to increase the role and relevance of research to technological, social and cultural evolution and to the needs of society” (Berlin Communiqué 2003: 7). Comparing the Berlin communiqué and most recent ERA documents, apart from the necessary and unavoidable lip-service on both sides, a general convergence of views can be seen. The divergence in views is growing with respect to one issue in particular, though: while the Commission (following the Lisbon agenda) uses increasingly economic perspective, the Bologna process again in Berlin confirmed the role of the “social dimension”: consequently, the need to increase competitiveness “must be balanced with the objective of improving the social characteristics of the European Higher Education Area, aiming at strengthening social cohesion and reducing social and gender inequalities both at national and at European level. In that context, Ministers reaffirm their position that higher education is a public good and a public responsibility” (Berlin Communiqué 2003: 1).

Documents of the European Commission rarely refer to classical models of the university; if they do, they do not label them explicitly as outmoded but rather indicate trends undermining their significance. On the Humboldt tradition the communiqué about the role of universities says the following:

> European universities have for long modelled themselves along the lines of some major models, particularly the ideal model of university envisaged nearly two centuries ago by Wilhelm von Humboldt in his reform of the German university, which sets research at the heart of university activity and indeed makes it the basis of teaching. Today the trend is away from these models, and toward greater differentiation (European Commission 2003b: 5-6).

The communication, as is obvious with the Commission’s documents, takes a much more economic than cultural or social perspectives (closer to the Bologna process) towards universities: “Given that they live thanks to substantial public and private funding, and that the knowledge they produce and transmit has a major impact on the economy and society, universities are also accountable for the way they operate and manage their activities and budgets to their sponsors and to the public” (European Commission 2003b: 9). (How similar it is to what can be heard on the other side of the Atlantic: “colleges and universities are thoroughly dependent on the goodwill of the public and of their elected representatives in state and federal government” (Leslie and Fretwell 1996: 283). The tone and the perspective of EHEA and ERA documents differ here considerably.

**RADICAL TRANSFORMATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIES:**
**TOWARDS A “HEALTHY AND FLOURISHING UNIVERSITY WORLD”**

Another issue raised by the European Commission is the following: are transformations facing European universities radical – and why? As a recent (2003) communication on investing in education and training puts it, “the challenge in education and training is likely to be even bigger than envisaged in Lisbon”. The challenge can be summarized in the following way:

> Providing an engine for the new knowledge-based European economy and society; overcoming accumulated delays and deficits in relation to key competitors; accommodating a severe demographic constraint; and overcoming high regional issues
that will be exacerbated by enlargement during the vital transition period. … Simply maintaining the status quo or changing slowly would clearly be hugely inadequate in the face of such a massive challenge (European Commission 2003a: 11, emphasis mine, MK).

Thus the European Union needs “a healthy and flourishing university world”; it needs “excellence” in its universities. At present, though, just as the situation of research is “worrying”, the situation of universities is bad as universities are “not trouble-free” and are not “globally competitive … even though they produce high quality scientific publications” (European Commission 2003b: 2). European universities generally “have less to offer” than their main competitors. Following criticism of the first communications about the ERA, this time the European Commission is trying to be as careful as possible about the role of universities, stating, inter alia, that universities – although not in general but only “in many respects” – but still “hold the key to the knowledge economy and society” (European Commission 2003b: 5); universities are also “at the heart of the Europe of Knowledge” (European Commission 2003b: 4). At the same time the stakes are very high and universities in the form they are functioning now are not acceptable. The largely economic perspective is quite clear. The idea is conveyed in many passages in fairly strong formulations.

So universities face an imperative need to “adapt and adjust” to a series of profound changes (European Commission 2003b: 6). They must rise to a number of challenges. They can only release their potential “by undergoing the radical changes needed to make the European system a genuine world reference” (European Commission 2003b: 11). They have to increase and diversify their income in the face of the worsening underfunding. Good golden age of universities’ Ivory Tower ideal (not mentioned) is over: “after remaining a comparatively isolated universe for a long period, both in relation to society and to the rest of the world, with funding guaranteed and a status protected by respect for their autonomy, European universities have gone through the second half of the 20th century without really calling into question the role or the nature of what they should be contributing to society” (European Commission 2003b: 22). Good for them, funding was guaranteed and not much reflection was required on their part…

But it is clearly over now, and no one should be surprised. Thus the “fundamental question” is the following:

  can the European universities, as they are and are organised now, hope in the future to retain their place, in society and in the world?” (European Commission 2003b: 22).

It is a purely rhetorical question in the context of the whole communication – the universities in Europe – as they are and as they are organized today – will not be able to retain their place. Restructuring is necessary, and a much wider idea of European integration applied to the higher education sector, expressed in the EHEA, comes in handy. Let us remind the goal of the ERA in another formulation: ”the creation of a frontier-free area for research where scientific resources are used more to create jobs and increase Europe’s competitiveness” (European Commission 2000c:1).
UNIVERSITIES AND THEIR STAKEHOLDERS: TOWARDS MAXIMIZING THE SOCIAL RETURN OF THE INVESTMENT?

Universities are responsible to their “stakeholders”; university training does not only affect those who benefit directly from it; inefficient or non-optimum use of resources affects the society at large. Thus the objective, the Commission argues, is to “maximise the social return of the investment” or “to maximise the social return on the investment represented by the studies it [society] pays for” (European Commission 2003b: 14). The communiqué sets three major objectives in creating a Europe of knowledge and in making European universities “a world reference”. Let us discuss them briefly.

The first objective is “ensuring that he European universities have sufficient and sustainable resources”. The communication acknowledges that the worsening under-funding of universities makes it difficult to maintain high profile of both teaching and research. It is difficult to keep and attract the best talent. In comparison with American universities, the means available in Europe, on average, per student are two to five times lower. Universities have to find new ways of increasing and diversifying their income, have to use available financial resources more effectively (“the objective must be to maximise the social return of the investment”), and they have to apply scientific research results more effectively, it is argued. The Commission identifies four main sources of university income: public funding for research and teaching in general (traditionally the main source of funding), private donations, income by selling services (including research and lifelong learning) and using research results and, finally, contributions from students (tuition and enrolment fees). It realistically acknowledges that “given the budgetary situation in the Member States and the candidate countries, there is a limited margin of maneuver for increasing public support” which we can read as highly improbable, if not impossible (European Commission 2003b: 13). Private donations are not fiscally attractive to potential donors and universities are not able to amass private funds. Selling services and research results is not attractive to universities as regulatory frameworks do not encourage them to do so (e.g. royalties are paid to the state). As to tuition fees, they are “generally limited or even prohibited” in Europe (again some countries of Central and Eastern Europe are exceptions). As inefficiencies of the system are concerned, the communication mentions a high dropout rate among students (40 per cent on average), a mismatch between the supply of qualifications and the demand for them, differing duration of studies for specific qualifications, the disparity of status and conditions of recruitment and work for pre and post-doctoral researchers, and a lack of a transparent system for calculating the cost of research. European universities do not create technological (“spin-off”) companies and do not have well-developed structures for managing research results.

The second objective is “consolidating the excellence of European universities”. There is a need for long term planning and financing in creating the right conditions for achieving excellence in research and teaching, the paper argues. “Excellence does not grow overnight”, and yet governments still budget on an annual basis and do not look beyond a limited number of years. There is also a need for efficient management structures and practices: universities should have an effective decision-making process, developed administration and financial management, and have the ability to match rewards to performance. There is a need for developing European centers and networks of excellence. Areas in which different universities have attained or can be expected to attain excellence should be identified - and research funds should be focused on them.
And the third objective is “broadening the perspective of European universities”. European universities are functioning in an increasingly “globalized” environment, the paper acknowledges. But the European environment is less attractive. Compared with the USA, “financial, material, and working conditions are not as good; the financial benefits of the use of research are smaller and career prospects are poorer”. Another important dimension for universities is serving local and regional development and strengthening European cohesion. Technology centers, science parks, local partnerships between universities and the industry should be encouraged (European Commission 2003b: 11-21). The three objectives sound very reasonable but are merely sketched in the present document. Given their importance, and often controversial character (tuition fees, “spin-off” companies, transformations of the academic profession etc), each of the objectives would deserve a separate treatment in the future.

**HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION BECAME A KEY PLAYER IN HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY: THE MAASTRICHT TREATY REVISITED**

Let us refer briefly to a booklet by the European Commission, *Education and Training in Europe: Diverse Systems, Shared Goals for 2010*. The introductory picture of European higher education systems is as follows:

The Europe of education and training reflects the diversity of languages, cultures and systems that are an inherent part of the identity of its member countries and their regions. Education and training have for a long time developed within national contexts and in relative isolation from each other. Countries and regions have a wide variety of education and training institutions, apply different admission rules, use different academic calendars, award hundreds of different degrees and qualifications reflecting a wide variety of curricula and training schemes. This diversity is valued very highly by nations as well as citizens: diversity is one thing all Europeans have in common. ... In the European Union the organisation of education and training systems and the content of learning programmes are the responsibility of the Member States – or their constituent regions as the case may be (European Commission 2002d: 5).

But the Lisbon Council of 2000 and its aftermath brought about a dramatic shift in thinking about national vs. European levels of competence in higher education:

At its meeting in Lisbon in March 2000, the European Council (the Heads of State or Government of the EU countries) acknowledged that the European Union was confronted with a quantum shift resulting from globalisation and the knowledge-driven economy, and agreed a strategic target for 2010: *To become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion*. These changes required not only a radical transformation of the European economy, but also a challenging programme for the modernisation of social welfare and education systems. The European Council called on the Education Council (the education ministers of the EU countries) and on the European Commission to undertake a general reflection on the concrete objectives of education systems, focusing on common concerns while respecting national diversity (European Commission 2002d: 7).

Current developments, especially the creation of the ERA, result from this shift of interest which signaled taking the idea of knowledge-based economies seriously. What followed, both in the ERA and in the EHEA, must be viewed in this context.
European universities have not been the focus of reflection on the European Union level since 1991 when *Memorandum on Higher Education in the European Community* was published. The competencies of the European Commission for higher education policy are limited. As *Towards a European Research Area* puts it, “the Treaty [of Maastricht, 1992] provides the European Union with a legal basis for measures to help to support European cooperation in research and technological development. However, *the principal reference framework for research activities in Europe is national*” (European Commission 2000a: 7, emphasis mine).

The Treaty of Maastricht introduced two new articles in the section on “Education, vocational training and youth”: article 149, point 1, states that “the Community shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while *fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity*”. The authority of EU is limited by a statements that the Community shall support and supplement the action of the Member States “while *fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content and organisation of vocational training*”. At the same time, EU shall adopt measures to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article, “*excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States*” (The Treaty on European Union 1992: art. 149, 150). It is certainly a good point to remind the principle of subsidiarity and its scope of application:

> the Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community (The Treaty on European Union 1992: art. 5).

Higher education is one of those areas which do not fall within exclusive competence of the European Union; the involvement of the EU is strictly defined and limited to some actions only (de Witt and Verhoeven 2001).

**THE LISBON AGENDA AND EDUCATION, OR HOW TO RESPOND TO A QUANTUM SHIFT TOWARDS KNOWLEDGE-DRIVEN ECONOMY**

Following the European Council meetings in Lisbon (which gave rise to the “Lisbon agenda” of transformations of European economy, welfare, and education) in 2000 and in Barcelona in 2002 (Barcelona European Council set a goal of European universities becoming “world quality reference” by 2010), the European Commission is clearly “enlarging its field of operation and policy implementation in education” (van der Wende 2003: 16).

The reason is clearly stated by the Commission: while responsibilities for universities lie essentially at national (or regional) level, the most important challenges are “European, and even international or global” (European Commission 2003b: 9). The divergence between the organization of universities at the national level and the emergence of challenges which go “beyond national frontiers” has grown and will continue to do so. Thus some shift of balance is necessary, and the Lisbon agenda combined with the emergence of the ERA provides new grounds for policy work at the European level no matter what particular Member States think
of it and no matter how they view restrictions on engagement in education issues imposed on the EU by the Maastricht Treaty.

Lisbon European Council of 2000 described the new economic and social challenge of the following decade as a “quantum shift resulting from globalisation and the challenges of a new knowledge-driven economy. These changes are affecting every aspect of people’s lives and require a radical transformation of the European economy”. Reaching a “strategic goal” (already quoted) for the next decade requires setting programs for building knowledge infrastructure, enhancing innovation and economic reform, and – of most interest to us here – “modernising social welfare and education systems” (Lisbon Council 2000: 1). The shift to a digital, knowledge-based economy will be a powerful engine for growth, competitiveness and growth, the communication argues. Consequently, the idea of a European Area of Research and Innovation was affirmed, with research and development’s role in “generating economic growth, employment and social cohesion” mentioned. The communication evoked the full exploitation of “the instruments under the Treaty and all other appropriate means” (Lisbon Council 2000: 3).

It is interesting to note that in the case of presidency conclusions of Lisbon Council and of Barcelona Council (of 2002), both stressing the role of education, research and development, universities are not mentioned at all, the word is non-existent except for two minor contexts: university degrees and an enhanced communication network for libraries, universities and schools. The necessary steps mentioned in Lisbon include mechanisms for networking, improving the environment for private research investment, benchmarking of national R&D policies, high speed transeuropean communication network, taking steps to increase mobility of researchers and introducing Community-wide patents (Lisbon Council 2000: 3-4). Again, neither higher education institutions nor universities appear as subjects, or objects, of these steps.

Let us remind here Roger Dale’s argument about the selectivity of shift in educational policies from the national to the European level: “as the politics of education moves to a European level as national economies become increasingly Europeanised, the education sector settlement – the arena on which the agenda for education comes into contact with the means of achieving the agenda – shifts selectively from the national to the European level. Very broadly, we might suggest that those elements linked directly to the reproduction of national social formations will remain at the nation-state level, while those more directly associated with the extended reproduction of the mode of production will move to the European level (increasingly the site and focus of that extended reproduction) (Dale 2003: 5; see Robertson and Dale 2003). The shift Dale evokes is seen in subsequent communiqués about the ERA.

**THE UNIVERSITY AND BOOSTING PRIVATE FUNDS, OR HOW TO INVEST EFFICIENTLY IN RESEARCH AND EDUCATION**

The European Commission, except for the 2003 communiqué on “universities”, prefers a much wider reference to “education and training”. In *Investing Efficiently in Education and Training: an Imperative for Europe* (2003), the role of higher education is relatively simple, as an introductory sentence puts it: “education and training are crucial to achieving the strategic goal set for the Member States at the Lisbon European Council to make the European Union the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy (and society) in the world”. No mention of “more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” is made this time (European Commission 2003a: 4) which clearly shows that the second part of the ideal is
subjected to the first. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that what provides the perspective of looking at higher education is the “relevance of education/training to the Lisbon goal” rather than relevance to anything else or anything more general (European Commission 2003a: 6). Making Europe a leading knowledge-based economy would be possible “only if education and training functioned as factors of economic growth, research and innovation, competitiveness, sustainable employment and social inclusion and active citizenship” (European Commission 2003a: 6). What is needed today is a “new investment paradigm” in education and training – what is going to change are not only variables of the investment model but also the underlying parameters (European Commission 2003a: 9). The communication mentions briefly the Bologna process (and the Bruges process in vocational training) as examples of moves in the right direction but hastens to add that “the pace of change does not yet match the pace of globalization, and we risk falling behind our competitors if it is not increased” (European Commission 2003a: 10). Again, it is interesting to note the extent to which the phenomenon of globalization is present in the ERA documents while being largely neglected in the Bologna documents and Bologna process itself.

In terms of financing, generally, in several recent communiqués, the issue of private investment in both research and higher education was raised. More Research for Europe. Towards 3% of GDP makes it clear that the increase in R&D investments in EU (from current 1.9% to 3% of GDP in 2010) is expected to come largely from private rather than public funds. Thus the main challenge is “to make R&D investment more attractive and profitable to business in the European Research Area” (European Commission 2002c: 5). And what is needed is “boosting private investment in research” as another communiqué calls one of its subsections (European Commission 2002a: 12-13). Still another communiqué reminds that

it is very important to realize that the largest share of this deficit stems from the low level of private investment in higher education and research and development in the EU compared with the USA. At the same time, private returns on investment in tertiary education remain high in most EU countries (European Commission 2003a: 13).

Consequently, if we take together low private investment levels in higher education (low private share in costs of studying) and high private returns on university education (higher professional status combined with higher salaries), the answer provided is to add to public funding by “increasing and diversifying investment in higher education” (European Commission 2003a: 13). As Henry and colleagues described the apparent paradox, “though education is now deemed more important than ever for the competitive advantage of nations, the commitment and capacity of governments to fund it have weakened considerably” (Henry et al. 2001: 30-31).

It is obvious that the idea conveyed to universities is that they should “do more (teaching and research) with less (public money)” but possibly with more private funds; when and how private investments are to come for research activities of universities is a much more pressing issue in the Region than in EU-15; it is enough to review the statistical data about share of business sector’s funding for research in both parts of Europe. From the perspective of transition countries, “boosting” private investment in research is unrealistic today, as opposed to boosting private investment in studying which already happened in hundreds of both public and private institutions in the Region with considerable share of fee-paying students. For most accession countries, though, to reach the EU goal – the level 3% of their GDP for research and development by 2010 – is largely impossible, especially taking into account current levels of funding in most of them. It is also interesting to note that the policy of the revenue
diversification in higher education in less industrialized countries (including some parts of the Region) may be not effective (Johnstone 2003).

THE HETEROGENEITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY LANDSCAPE, OR ABOUT THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION

How do ERA documents refer to universities in Central and Eastern Europe: they emphasize “frequently difficult circumstances of universities in the accession countries as regards human and financial resources” (European Commission 2003b: 3), “the worsening of these factors [divergence between national organization of universities and European challenges they face] which will come with the enlargement of the Union, owing to a greater level of heterogeneity of the European university landscape which will ensue” (2003b: 10). Similarly, a communiqué on More Research for Europe reminds that the share of business funding is very low in most accession countries and concludes: “the diversity of situations in Europe calls for differentiated but co-ordinated policies to establish a common upward momentum to reach the 3% objective (European Commission 2002c: 8). Even though I am not especially fond of describing catastrophic situation of both private and public funding for research activities in most accession countries by way of euphemisms like “difficult circumstances of universities”, “heterogeneity of the European university landscape”, and “diversity of situations in Europe”, at least I must acknowledge the fact that huge gaps between EU-15 and some of the accession countries are clearly recognized in ERA documents.

In the Bologna documents, on the other hand, it is hard to find even euphemisms to describe different points of departure in the integration project. Not a single official document acknowledges the massive difference between universities in affluent countries of the West and universities in transition countries. What is widely acknowledged, by contrast, is a wide linguistic and cultural diversity among European institutions. Let me quote here a passage from the Salamanca Convention’s message, “Shaping the European Higher Education Area”:

> European higher education is characterized by its diversity in terms of languages, national systems, institutional types and profiles and curricular orientation. At the same time its future depends on its ability to organise this valuable diversity effectively to produce positive outcomes rather than difficulties, and flexibility rather than opacity (Salamanca Convention 2001: 2).

While ERA documents at least mention problems faced by transition countries (by the 10 accession countries), Bologna documents do not even try to see and conceptualize the issue, and hence another set of my serious concerns about the Bologna integration project. Consequently, the next section is devoted to Bologna and the transition countries.

2. THE BOLOGNA PROCESS AND THE TRANSITION COUNTRIES

ON INTERRELATED PLANES, OR BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL GOOD INTENTS AND THE REALITY

The fundamental issue to me in the present paper is to analyze whether and how the Bologna process may affect national higher education systems in the Region. The issue has to be dealt with at several interrelated planes: the official plane of ministers of education/governments,
conferences of rectors and university associations, and accompanying changes in laws on higher education, laws on for-profits, laws on (educational and other) non-profit associations, on research funds and scientific degrees and titles; the official plane of particular higher education institutions i.e. that of senior university management; and finally the practical plane of particular institutions and their faculty. There is a huge gap between good will (and good intents) on the part of ministers of education in the majority of those countries of the Region which are official members of the Bologna process and the reality of the functioning of higher education systems in these countries. There is a huge gap between intentions expressed by the officials and capabilities to act they – and institutions themselves – can currently offer for the integration project (also the motivation for joining the Bologna process seems often more “political” than “educational”, see Tomusk 2002b).

Higher education in the Region, generally and with a few exceptions, is in a state of permanent crisis since the fall of Communism (for case studies of success stories, see Marga 1997; Ten Years After 2000): from the paralysis of substantial research functions to steady decreasing public funds to the mushrooming of both public and private diploma mills to corruption to lowering of the professional ethos and morale, with the combination of the above depending on the country. There has not been enough general reflection on transformations of higher education systems in the Region in recent decade; as Andrei Marga sadly remarked in a paper about “reforming the postcommunist university”, “politics and law, macroeconomics and finance, civil rights and liberties, the church and the family, have all been objects of consideration. But universities – despite the vital roles they play in providing research and expertise and in selecting and forming the leaders of tomorrow – have not” (Marga 1997: 159). Reforming higher education in postcommunist Europe, with some notable exceptions, has not been sufficiently analyzed either locally or by Western scholars.

Paradoxically enough, in the majority of countries in question the situation of the universities, in the areas other than academic freedom, institutional autonomy, and international mobility of students and faculty, has severely decreased in the last decade. Even though it may be quite possible to go on with the Bologna process in these countries in terms of legislation, it is much more difficult to go on with it in terms of implementing the ideas at the institutional level (leaving aside for the moment the whole idea of to what extent it is beneficial to the countries in question to follow all recommendations of the process).

**ON UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS, OR KNOWLEDGE-BASED EUROPE HAS ARRIVED**

Let us remind again that the Bologna process is based on the underlying assumptions (not really formulated in a single place) that both Europe and the world are entering a new era of knowledge-based and market-driven economies competing against each other; Europe as a region has to struggle with its two main competitors in higher education and research and development: the USA and Japan (Australasia); the knowledge society depends for its growth on the production, transmission, dissemination, and use of new knowledge, or as the *Towards ERA* communication described it: “in the final years of the 20th century we entered a knowledge-based society. Economic and social development will depend essentially on knowledge in its different forms” (European Commission 2000a: 5); the underlying goal behind current transformations of educational systems and research and development, whether expressed directly (in ERA documents) or indirectly (accompanied by the “social dimension”, in EHEA documents), is more or less to meet the target set out by the European Council in Lisbon (in 2000): Europe by 2010 must become “the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”. Also the creation of the European Higher Education Area must be completed by 2010 (how to develop benchmarks of success and what is going to happen after the deadline are other issues). Europe is at the crossroads; it is trying to combine higher competitiveness and social cohesion in an increasingly globalized world and it is in the process of transition towards a “knowledge society”. Thus knowledge becomes the key issue in the years to come. As a Third European Report on Science & Technology Indicators 2003 argues,

of course knowledge per se is not a new asset; it has always been a basis for human activity. However, what is radically new is the pace of its creation, accumulation and diffusion resulting in economies and society following a new knowledge-based paradigm. Working and living conditions are being redefined; markets and institutions are being redesigned under new rules and enhanced possibilities for the exchange of information. Moreover, knowledge is not only becoming the main source of wealth for people, businesses and nations, but also the main source of inequalities between them (European Commission 2003c: 1).

Even though the Trends III report prepared for the Berlin summit mentions “globalization” no more than five times in total (which is a reflection of its descriptive rather than analytical ambitions), it states overtly that ministers and higher education institutions should “ride the tiger of globalisation rather than hope it will disappear” (Reichert and Tauch 2003: 57). In general, though, the underlying assumptions are not developed in more detail in any of its documents or reports.

**INWARD-LOOKING BOLOGNA, OR ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF EUROCENTRISM**

The Bologna process seems largely inward-looking: while globally, the impact of globalization on higher education policies is widely acknowledged, it is hard to believe but none of the official documents – from Sorbonne to Bologna to Prague to Berlin, and none of the accompanying declarations (Salamanca and Graz) – even once uses the word “globalization”. And unquestionably globalization is the main driving force behind current transformations of the public sector, welfare state model and educational policies worldwide (see Pierson 1996, Esping-Andersen 2001, United Nations 2001); it is also one of the main reference points in the EU overall Lisbon strategy.

The result is that the Bologna process so far is relatively weak on analytical level (and therefore it hardly ever goes beyond practical issues of mobility, comparability, adaptability and curricular convergence). It is worrying indeed that main and supporting documents of a huge intellectual and institutional undertaking which aims at changing the way our universities function are not able, or not willing, to present an analytical approach to current challenges and solutions based on perspectives wider than European. As Erkki Berndtson in a paper on the EHEA rightly remarks, “the goals of the Bologna Declaration (and of the Prague communiqué) have been presented as solutions to the problems which have never been outlined systematically. This may have been one of the reasons for the fast development of the process, but without a systematic analysis of problems and challenges which the European Higher Education Area faces today, there is a danger that the cosmetic features of the reform will be strengthened” (Berndtson 2003: 10).
The ambivalence of the Bologna process concerns the very process of globalization: roughly, there may be at least two contrasting (and simplified) global views of Bologna. The first view may present it as a merely introduction to a much further-reaching integration of national educational systems in the future, resulting from competitive pressures from other parts of the world resulting in turn from global liberalization of operations of higher education institutions worldwide (especially in two biggest “exporters” of educational services, North America and Australasia). The second, contrasting, view may present Bologna as a large-scale defensive mechanism to avoid the pitfalls of globalization as seen (and mostly disliked) globally today and to stay together in Europe against the global odds. Thus the first view may imply a strong convergence between Bologna and globalisation processes on a regional scale, especially in the future, while the second may imply an attempt to make national educational systems stronger against the forces of globalization and to stay away from whatever is seen as its excesses in higher education, especially the processes of privatization, commercialization, commodification etc. Due to the ambivalence of the process, I find it difficult to say which of the views would be a more adequate description of it today. The two threads are certainly very much interwoven in its documents. Both “protectionist” threads for the European level can be found (especially in referrals to education as a public “good and responsibility” which means mostly calls for public funding from national states in the future) and “expansionist” threads of attracting foreign students and researchers in a global competition for talent. As Dirk Van Damme put it convincingly, “Europe is seeking its own way out between the Scylla of academic capitalism and the Charybdis of protectionism” (Van Damme 2003: 6).

**EDUCATIONAL RESTRUCTURING,
OR FROM “MATTER OF PRINCIPLE” TO “INSTITUTIONAL FORMS AND PRACTICE”**

Some analysts may be concerned about “cosmetic” changes to be introduced by the EHEA; others, including myself, may be even more concerned about potentially misguided decisions (for as Guy Neave keeps reminding, it is time in the Bologna process when “matters of principle” are beginning to translate into “institutional form and practice”) based on misguided analyses and largely irrelevant recommendations, as might be the case in some transition countries. I find it difficult to present good and convincing reasons in Bologna documents why the “harmonisation of the architecture” of higher education systems is so crucial in Europe today. Certainly student mobility is quite a good reason but is has always been marginal in terms of numbers of those involved, and there are limited chances that it can be considerably increased in the future, which is perfectly evidenced by a multi-year comprehensive and all-European study on students, *Eurostudent 2000* (it is useful here to remind Guy Neave’s text on the “European Dimension” in higher education and his distinction between “inter-territorial” student mobility in Medieval times and current “international” mobility: for, “effectively, the nation … did not exist as a political unit” at that time; there was also common space, defined by religious credence, Latin as the language of instruction and a uniform program of study – the *studium generale* (Neave 2001b: 15). On the labor market, on the other hand, some graduates are sought and others are turned down, no matter if they carry a Diploma Supplement with them or not. It would be very interesting to analyze the attitude of the industry – those who should employ those wandering European graduates – toward Bologna developments, from Diploma Supplement to the “European Book of Competencies” about to emerge. There may be also concerns about various senses of “harmonization”, some of which may potentially lead to some still unspecified core (European) curricula, as evidenced by such pilot projects as “Tuning Educational Structures in
Europe” (now in the second phase). There are strong semantic differences between “convergence”, “harmonization” and finally “uniformity” but at the same time there are concerns that traditional semantic differences may get increasingly blurred as Bologna progresses. Personally, I am not convinced by the programmatic statement of the “Tuning” project at all; I wish future developments could really take the course described vividly below but I find it not secured: “the name *Tuning* has been chosen for the project to reflect the idea that universities do not look for harmonisation of their degree programmes or any sort of unified, prescriptive or definitive European curricula but simply for points of reference, convergence and common understanding. The protection of the rich diversity of European education has been paramount in the Tuning project from the very start and the project in no way seeks to restrict the independence of academic and subject specialists, or damage local and national academic authority”.

**AN ANALYTICAL FLAW, OR ON NEW AND OLD CHALLENGES IN HIGHER EDUCATION**

Another issue is the following: are problems facing most of current EU-15 countries and their higher education systems the same as problems facing the countries in transition? I believe the important aspect of the Bologna process in its current geographical, economic and social scope is both analytical, and consequently practical, negligence of some most pressing problems in transition countries today. The analytical flaw of documents and reports is the lack of description of old challenges that the transition countries still face, and consequently the lack of any clear recommendations on how to proceed in these countries plagued by two different sets of challenges at the same time, old and new ones.

To put it in a nutshell, while the affluent European countries face merely new challenges brought about by the emergence of the knowledge-based economy, globalization pressures on higher education and research activities, life-long learning etc, almost a dozen of transition countries, to varying degrees, face old challenges as well. A recent report by the World Bank (*Constructing Knowledge Societies: New Challenges for Tertiary Education*) rightly says that developing and transition countries are confronted with a “dual task”: “a key concern is whether developing and transition countries can adapt and shape their tertiary education systems to confront successfully this combination of old and new challenges” (World Bank 2002: 2). The report states that tertiary education can indeed play in developing and transition countries a catalytic role in rising to challenges of the knowledge-based economy but

this is conditional on these countries’ ability to overcome the serious problems that have plagued tertiary education systems and have pushed some systems into a situation of severe crisis (World Bank 2002: 45).

The Bologna process seems to focus on new challenges and new problems (i.e. problems of Western countries); the countries of the Region, in contrast, are still embedded in challenges and problems of the old type generated mostly in a recent decade by the process of shifting from elite to mass higher education under severe resource constraints and with the burden of a legacy of what the World Bank analysis summarizes as “inequalities in access and outcomes, inadequate educational quality, low relevance to economic needs, and rigid governance and management structures” (World Bank 2002: 46). Even though the way Western Europe has dealt with the passage from elite to mass higher education is well documented, the global environment in which the process took place will not be available again. It was a process which was taking place under different political, economic, and social constraints. Both
higher education and research and development had totally different reference points; the universities were still national treasures lavishly funded by nation-states in the period of the consolidation of the expanded welfare state model. Last but not least, politics still mattered more than economy, national prestige often more than particular decisions about resource allocations. As Philip G. Altbach describes vividly these times,

the era of the Cold War was characterized by the efforts of the major powers to dominate the “hearts and minds” of the peoples of the world. The Soviet Union, the United States, and others spent lavishly on student exchanges, textbook subsidies, book translations, institution building, and other activities to influence the world’s academic leaders, intellectuals, and policymakers. The goals were political and economic, and higher education was a key battlefield. The rationale was sometimes couched in the ideological jargon of the Cold War but was often obscured by rhetoric about cooperation. … We are now in a new era of power and influence. Politics and ideology have taken a subordinate role to profits and market-driven policies. (Altbach 2002: 6 typescript).

But this time is over. It is a real challenge in some European transition countries today to undergo the passage from elite to mass higher education, to have steadily declining public funds almost each consecutive year and develop higher education systems towards the “Bologna goals” which have to be met by “knowledge-based economies”; with no external funds, and virtually no, on average, government funds. Trends III report makes it clear that it is unrealistic to believe that Bologna reforms are costless: public funds are expected to come if reforms are to succeed. For the countries of the Region, it is almost guaranteed, again on average, that the funds will not come from any source. The chronic underfunding of higher education, widely documented by any statistical data we want, taken in any way we want (as % of GDP devoted to higher education, as % of GDP devoted to research, as funding per student etc, referred to the USA, EU-15 or OECD) makes it very difficult to implement Bologna recommendations in any other than theoretical way. It makes it difficult to face old and new challenges. There are no specific recommendations or prescriptions for the transition countries how to proceed based on experiences that EU-15 or OECD countries had had with the same process of passing from elite to expanded models of higher education two-three decades ago.

It is a crucial point: how to combine educational reforms pressed from two types of challenges, old and new, traditional and knowledge economy- and globalization-related? How to weigh their relevance today – should transition countries look for past or for current experiences of other advanced and affluent countries in thinking about their higher education systems? How to progress in basic reforms related to much higher demand and consequent massification of higher education if the material basis for these reforms, the welfare state, is either already dismantled or in the process of decomposition or even never had had a chance to exist? As Voldemar Tomusk captures the point,

with the decline of the welfare state and massification of higher education in the West, the Eastern vision on the resource abundant University has become mere dream. The simple truth about the current higher education reform is that the only thing we know for sure is that we want our Universities to have considerably more resources; … Looking at the resources available in the particular countries one can easily conclude that this is absolutely impossible. It is an empirical fact different form many unrealistic growth programs developed to attract foreign matching funds (Tomusk 2000: 55).

How does the Berlin communiqué see the problem of the differences between challenges
facing higher education in transition countries and in EU-15 countries and how does it see the issue of new members in the Bologna process? “Countries party to the European Cultural Convention shall be eligible for membership of the European Higher Education Area provided that they at the same time declare their willingness to pursue and implement the objectives of the Bologna Process in their own systems of higher education. Their applications should contain information on how they will implement the principles and objectives of the declaration. … Ministers recognise that membership of the Bologna Process implies substantial change and reform for all signatory countries. They agree to support the new signatory countries in those changes and reforms, incorporating them within the mutual discussions and assistance, which the Bologna Process involves” (Berlin Communiqué 2003: 8). The problem in question is thus basically neglected, no further analysis or description of current situation is provided and no recommendations how to proceed given.

And let us remind very briefly some key figures to show the gap between EU candidate countries and EU-15. First, percentage of GDP spent on research and development: none of the candidate countries reaches the level of the EU-average of 1.9%, even though Slovenia (1.5%) and the Czech Republic (1.2%) have relatively high levels of research and development expenditure in relation to their GDP. Estonia, Poland, Hungary, and Slovak Republic invest in R&D at the same level as the EU countries with the lowest R&D intensities (such as Greece and Portugal). All other candidate countries (as well as all remaining Bologna signatory countries) from the region have very low R&D intensity. The above figures need to be viewed from the perspective of GDP, though, and the differences are still huge. While GDP per capita in the European Union in 2001 was 23 200 in PPS (purchasing power standards) at current prices, it was in the range of 5 000 to 10 000 in Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Estonia, with the top level reached by the two small countries (Cyprus 18 460 and Slovenia 15 970) and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovak Republic in the range of 11 000-13 000 (European Commission 2002e: 18). If we look at other Bologna signatory countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia or Russia) the gap gets drastically wider (World Bank 1999: 60).

The share of research and development activities financed by the business sector is lower than the EU average in almost all candidate countries (and all other Bologna signatory countries from the region), except for Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Romania. The current distribution of researchers (government, business, higher education) is much different in candidate countries than in EU – the share of the business sector is much lower than the average EU 50% (except for Romania). In terms of patents applied for per million population, the difference is huge, with the range between 1 and 12 for almost all candidate countries (and 22 for Slovenia), with 126 as the EU average (European Commission 2002e: 72). Also spending on higher education as percentage of GDP is generally considerably lower in the Region, as are current enrollment rates in higher education (World Bank 2000a: 122).

These data cannot be neglected in thinking about the emergent European Higher Education Area: we are talking about mostly different societies and economies, with mostly different standards of living, and substantially different higher education systems still facing large structural reforms, especially if we go beyond EU and current EU candidate countries. If knowledge economy, the point of reference for both the EHEA and ERA, is emerging from two defining forces – the “rise in knowledge intensity of economic activities” and the “increasing globalisation of economic affairs” (Houghton and Sheehan 2000: 2), the Region is far behind indeed, and the chances to get closer to current EU countries are very low in at least short and medium run (for more data, see OECD 1999).
THE EXCLUSION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN HIGHER EDUCATION, OR ON THE NEW TERRA INCOGNITA

Surprisingly enough, the private sector in higher education has so far been absent from the scope of interest of the Bologna process (for the need to compare privatness and publicness of higher education, see Levy 1986. How to think of publicly-supported universities in the UK charging full tuition to non-EU students as one of the ways of their “internationalization”, or of publicly-funded universities in Central and Eastern Europe charging full tuition to evening and weekend students, thereby competing directly with the “private” sector with no public funding, or with public funding for student loans only?). From the very beginning, the Sorbonne Declaration, through Bologna – Prague – Berlin, as well as from Salamanca to Graz declarations of higher education institutions, there have been nothing about the private sector. What may have been understandable in Magna Charta Universitatum of 1988, can hardly find a good explanation in 2003, taking into account both global developments in higher education and the explosion of the private sector in many Central and East European countries participating in the Bologna process. For the official documents and accompanying reports, the private sector does not exist. It is no man’s land in European policies and terra incogita in Bologna-related documents. While declarations and communiqués of the Bologna process do not make a single reference to private higher education – not even once in recent six years, Trends III report of 150 pages mentions the term half a dozen times but only in connection with GATS negotiations, as if the issue of the emergent private sector both globally and in many signatory countries was somehow insignificant.

I would like to claim here the contrary: the rapid development of the private sector in some countries of the Region is of crucial importance and its omission creates a severe analytical and operational flaw in the Bologna process referred to the Region. It also goes against global trends according to which the role of the private sector in teaching and research is becoming increasingly significant. As Philip G. Altbach put it, “private higher education is one of the most dynamic and fastest-growing segments of postsecondary education at the turn of the 21st century. A combination on unprecedented demand for access to higher education and the inability or unwillingness of governments to provide the necessary support has brought private higher education to the forefront” (Altbach 1999: 1). Both globally and in the Region, private higher education is part of the problem and part of the solution; no matter how we view the problem and the solution, we certainly should not disregard the phenomenon itself.

Already in 1994 the percentage share of enrolment in private higher education was over 60 in Belgium and over 50 in the Netherlands (almost entirely subsidized by the state, though) and 25 in Portugal (World Bank 2000: 30), with the share in Central and Eastern Europe increasing considerably: the number of private higher education providers has been skyrocketing in recent years and the number of students enrolled in the private sector is reaching (in some countries, like Poland and Romania) the level of 30 per cent, and in others (like Estonia or Moldova) almost 25 per cent, in the 2000/2001 (with the lower end of the Czech Republic with 1.0, Albania 0.0, Slovakia 0.7; and Russia with 10, Belarus with 13, Bulgaria with 11.5 and Hungary with 14 percent staying in the middle). Poland, Romania, and Estonia from the higher end and Russia, Bulgaria and Hungary from the middle are all signatory countries of the Bologna process. It is only the Explanatory Report to the Lisbon Convention (Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications Concerning Higher Education in the European Region, 1997) that notices the existence of the private sector stating that “there has also been a rapid increase in the number of private institutions. This development, which is
present in most countries, is particularly acute in some of the central and eastern European countries”.

Apparently, the issue of the private sector is not problematic for the Bologna process. But it certainly is a huge problem for several transition countries. The majority of international literature in the field of higher education policy and research deals with reforming public higher education. The role of the private sector in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe – considering its ability to adapt to the new societal needs and new market conditions combined with the drastically underfunded and still unreformed public institutions – is bound to grow. East European private universities represent a wide variety of missions, organizational frameworks, legal status and relations to the established institutional order (see Tomusk 2003). There are significant differences between the particular countries of the Region, too; as Peter Rado in his *Transition in Education* argued, one of the most important aspects of transition in CEE countries is the interdependence of “economic and structural reforms” and “reforms of public services”. As he puts it,

> the extent to which economic change occurred predefines the extent of change in other sectors. For example, in those countries where privatization, structural transformation of the economy and the creation of legal environment of a market economy has ended, where foreign investment is remarkable and the economy is already growing (e.g. Poland and Hungary) the challenges to educational reform are completely different than in other countries, where only the first steps are made in this process (such as Slovakia and Romania) (Rado 2001: 16).

It is interesting to note, based on what Rado says, that in the case of the development of the private sector in higher education such a correlation cannot be observed, to compare Romania and Slovakia, or Moldova and the Czech Republic in terms of the number of private institutions and the level of enrollments in the private sector. In a strange way, it actually does not matter for the private sector how market reforms are advanced in other sectors of economy although it seems to matter a lot for the public sector in higher education.

Generally, the triumph of the market economy have contributed to the emergence of the private sector and its huge social (and tacit political) acceptance in many countries of the Region. From the perspective of changing societal needs and relatively declining public support for higher education, rapidly increasing demand for access combined with the institutional and financial paralysis of the public sector generally, there is a growing need for clear policies and thoughtful legislation (especially that what we are facing in the Region is what D. Bruce Johnstone calls *creeping austerity* from a global perspective: “a slow but unrelenting worsening of the financial condition of most universities and other institutions of higher education, particularly as they are dependent on governmental, or tax-generated, revenue” (Johnstone 2003: 2). The Bologna process should clearly provide some guidance; the policy of not seeing the problem (or the solution) will not be useful in the long run.

**ON EMERGING MARKET FORCES IN HIGHER EDUCATION**

Emerging market forces in higher education combined with increasing competitiveness in the field, significant growth in size of the private sector definitely mean increased access, new learning options and improved productivity; but the phenomenon also raises important questions about affordability, quality control, need for new regulations and accreditation bodies, social responsibilities of the private sector as well as about the very fundamental
attributes of higher education so far – such as civic commitment, disinterested research, its double role of the vehicle of social mobility and a locus of critical thought (Altbach 1999). Concerns are raised about the social role (or rather roles – see Levy 2002) of private higher education in the Region.

The main concern of policymakers and policy scholars - i.e. reforming public higher education – does not go in pair with the concern for the new and increasingly significant private sector. Both short-term and long-term policy implications are at stake: in the short run, it is useful to engage in a debate about new opportunities (and new threats) provided by the dramatic growth of the private sector in parts of the Region, to contribute to formulating a thoughtful public policy about the emerging new higher education map. In the long run, though, it is also useful to raise public awareness of more fundamental issues associated with the advent of the private sector, market forces and fierce competition to the arena of higher education: should the expansion of private higher education last, how much responsibility does it have to the public good? How to balance the need for civic engagement, disinterested scholarship, social mobility and traditional values of higher education with the impact brought about to higher education by new private, often for-profit education providers? How to save the core of the ideals of modern higher education in the face of market forces serving private interests rather than the public good? How to regulate the competition between old state-run providers with new, often powerful and cost-efficient private providers? Or maybe leave it to the market and consumers i.e. students? (Altbach 1999). What is certainly needed is the disinterested analysis of the current (in-transition) state of affairs, largely unexplored so far in policy research, and conclusions as to how to deal, in theory and in practice, with growing market forces in education; how to regulate privatization and corporatization of educational institutions and research activities within ongoing reform attempts, and finally how to accommodate principles of the “European Research Area” and requirements of the Bologna process to local conditions of those EU accession countries where the private sector has recently grown surprisingly strong. Unfortunately, the Bologna process in general remains indifferent to these developments even though their appearance may prefigure many future options which governments of Western European countries may face if the dismantling of the welfare state will be as radical as some sociologists and political scientists present it (Clayton and Pontusson 1998, Pierson 2001).

Not surprisingly, both Trends III report and official documents from Sorbonne to Berlin generally disregard market forces in higher education; whenever the reports uses the word “market” at all, it is almost always “labor market”. Not only in its descriptions but also in its projections and recommendations for the future. GATS negotiations is a different, delicate and complicated issue which I am not going to develop here. What I want to stress, though, is the fact that the exclusive passage in Trends III report where possible market orientation of (segments of) higher education and research are mentioned, is a short passage on GATS. Among threats that the inclusion of higher education in the GATS, it mentions increased competition and commercialisation in order to secure market advantage might undermine the Bologna Process which depends on cooperation and exchange of good practice. … The increased market orientation of higher education may run counter to core academic values, the recognition of students as partners rather than customers and the commitment to widened access as a mechanism for social, political and economic inclusion. … Finally, the increase of private providers and for-profit activities of public higher education institutions would result in further decreases in state funding and state protection (Reichert and Tauch 2003: 56).
I may agree whole-heartedly with the above criticism and it will not make the emergence of market forces in higher education disappear; it will not annul global trends with respect to the relations between the state and the market and will not stop public sector reforms already undertaken all over the world (see Kwiek 2003a, Weiler 2000). I understand that it is very useful to stand firmly where we, the academic world, have come from; but I am wondering whether it is better to defend the territory until the last soldier (of market-free higher education) dies or to at least conceptually analyze what transformations are currently taking place globally and why. At the same time, though, it is useful to bear in mind what many analysts say about contemporary reframing of our debates on the state and its social services: the stakes are very high, as Ulrich Beck, one of the best Continental sociologists today, argues, “what is at issue today, then, is not ‘only’ the millions of unemployed, nor only the future of the welfare state, the struggle against poverty or the possibility of greater social justice. Everything we have is at stake. Political freedom and democracy in Europe is at stake” (Beck 2000: 62, emphasis mine). In the case of educational debates, some analysts acknowledge the stakes to be equally high: Ingrid Lohmann can be a good example of serious concerns deriving form the fact that

what we are dealing with today is the question of whether or not systems of public education will still be there in the future. In most countries around the globe, the public sector – including the supply of drinking water, energy, medical care and other goods – is at stake today (Lohmann 2002: 1).

**HOW TO “RIDE THE TIGER OF GLOBALIZATION” AND NOT TO ANALYZE MARKET FORCES**

It is especially interesting to note this clear analytical omission in the context of the permanent reference point for the Bologna process (as well as for the ERA) being the USA, “our competitor”, where market forces are increasingly important. Obviously market-driven and market-oriented higher education does not go in pair with the European social model but in such an overarching integrating initiative as the EHEA, with the objectives of the ERA behind it – plain political and economic goal of making the European Union “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy (and society) in the world” (EU Lisbon Council 2000) and making it “a world reference for the quality and the relevance of its education and training” as well as “the most attractive world region to students, scholars and researchers” (EU Barcelona Council 2002) – it is a severe flaw to disregard the theme altogether.

EU-15 is one of the last places in the world which is relatively resistant to market forces in education and research; again, some countries of Central and Eastern Europe, for a variety of institutional, political and economic reasons, are much more influenced by market forces and their higher education institutions are already operating in highly competitive, market-driven and customer-driven environments. At the same time, from a global perspective, there are no doubts about the direction of changes. My guess is that no matter if the Bologna process wants it or not, or Bologna process documents and analyses mention the phenomenon or not, the change is taking place everywhere and market forces will come, and in numerous places have already come, to European higher education institutions. It is a fact, whether we like it or not. The world today is too strongly interrelated (globalization!) to assume that although market forces are affecting higher education globally, the last bastion of resistance will be the signatory countries of the Bologna process (especially that the market forces have already come as part of a much wider package of institutional changes of the welfare state model and
they will not go away). We may not care about the market; but we have to care about universities increasingly exposed to its forces. An underlying assumption of any large-scale transformation (and the Bologna process is certainly a huge undertaking with far-reaching goals) is that it should not disregard the world outside; it should not disregard social and economic trends at home and abroad. In the case of a vast restructuring project of national higher education systems in Europe, home is Europe, and abroad is certainly the global dimension of the issue. Let me remind Philip G. Altbach again, with his historical note:

globalization cannot be completely avoided. History shows that when universities shut themselves off from economic and societal trends they become moribund and irrelevant. European universities, for example, ignored both the Renaissance and the Industrial Revolution and ceased to be relevant. Indeed, the French Revolution swept away the universities entirely, while von Humboldt had to reinvent the German university model in 1809 in order to save the institutions. At the same time, institutions and systems do possess great latitude in how they deal with globalization. Thus, those who argue that there is just one model for higher education in the 21st century are clearly wrong. (Altbach 2002: 2, typescript)

How can you “ride the tiger of globalisation” in the European higher education of the future, to remind the Trends III recommendation, and forget about market forces? I am in agreement with Marijk van der Wende when she states that “the fact that present and future students already live in a global world is simply forgotten, although important part of their culture, fashion and music, or numerous products they wish to buy, or the ways in which they intend to communicate, are all defined and marketed globally. This should help shape the universities’ response to globalisation. Our customers expect their lifestyles to be taken into account and higher education to prepare them adequately for life and work in a global work” (van der Wende 1999: 64). And the emergent influence of market forces in all aspects of our social life is what globalization is about, among other things. Still another is the increasing priority of economy to politics. I believe the Bologna process is one of those instances of political actions which, if they want to be successful, they will have to be able to be easily translatable into economic terms (as is the case with the ERA). And in these terms, market forces figure prominently. Only British higher education system is briefly discussed to counterbalance developments in Continental Europe. It is difficult, though, in the long run, to combine the analytical position in which the dominant model is the one in which there is “a sustained emphasis on higher education as a public good and responsibility” and which at the same time clearly acknowledges that “public funding is in the process of undermining it” (Reichert and Tauch 2003: 143-144). Is not the model being undermined by a constellation of factors among which the invasion of market forces in the public sector generally comes to the fore? Let me remind “The Futures Project: Policy for Higher Education in a Changing World” again:

New forces are reshaping higher education. For the last half-century higher education has grown in size, resources, and importance. Higher education has, as well, a remarkably stable structure. Now, powerful changes are underway, driven by the entry of new providers of higher education, both for-profit and non-profit; the explosion of virtual education; rapid advances in technology; demographic shifts; and the globalization of a sector that has typically been open only to indigenous institutions. The higher education environment is increasingly competitive, and the reins of government are loosening worldwide in favor of market-driven decision making – a trend that is disturbing the tranquility of a stable, confident system. As market forces grow in importance there is a chance for significant gains or for significant setbacks (Newman 2000: 2).
To sum up, both the private sector in European (and especially Central and East European) higher education systems and the emergence of powerful market forces in the educational and research landscape in Europe will have to be further analyzed, discussed and incorporated into the Bologna process if it is not to turn into a merely “theoretical” exercise, especially but not exclusively in the Region. Knowing the high stakes of both EHEA and ERA initiatives, I am sure this omission will soon be corrected.

AMBIVALENT BOLOGNA

One of the most skeptical views on the Bologna process was presented already in 2001 by Guy Neave (Neave 2001a). I share many points from his acute analysis (which I actually heard vividly presented in Porto). I share some concerns he raises, coming from a different – and certainly less favored – part of the world. I agree with Neave when he states that Bologna is “an Act of Appropriation”: “it is built upon – and brings together – trends already present in different systems and presents them as part of the Bologna process. It does not create them”. I agree with him also when he calls Bologna “an exercise in consciousness-raising” and when he evokes “productivist overtones” and connotations of the (vague) notion of “employability” as an objective of first-tier studies in the Bologna process (Neave 2001a: 6, 9). I am as puzzled as Neave when I turn “to the question of what we are constructing” (Neave 2001a: 2) and I am equally unsure about the end (and ends) of such a European construction. My attitude towards Bologna is more ambivalent, though. It is true that those who speak most loudly about a “European” higher education system come either from the European Commission or from Central and Eastern Europe. And I fully agree that “it may be the shape of things to come. But it is not the way French, Belgians, Dutch, and, least of all, British, view matters. Rather, we tend to be abominably sensitive to our differences and sing the praise of our exceptionalism – perhaps never more so when we feel they are under severe pressure” (Neave 2002: 20-21). Academics in Central and Eastern Europe, from the countries which are almost all (with a few small exceptions) involved in the Bologna process, are abominably sensitive to the near-collapse state of (some of) their national systems of higher education. They are sensitive to differences between them and view them as basically irrelevant in the face of the gravity of problems – higher education systems in the Region have been in a state of permanent crisis for well over a decade now (which is portrayed by Voldemar Tomusk whose first-rate knowledge of Central and East European higher education systems is based on analytical tools applied to excellent first-hand experience, see Tomusk 2002). It is very difficult to avoid the feeling of nostalgia to old good times of Western European higher education which had been a major point of reference in the Region for several decades. We certainly could have compared our systems with those in developing countries – we would have felt much better – but we insisted on having European higher education as our points of reference, despite huge differences between them. From our perspective, differences are still even today, largely irrelevant (except for the UK/Continent differences). That is one of the reasons the idea of a “European” higher education area has quite a few (ambivalent) supporters in the Region. There is an irreconcilable difference in perspectives between the academic world of affluent Western European democracies and the chronically underfunded, near-collapsing academic world of (some) postcommunist countries in Central and (South-) Eastern Europe, including Russia and the Balkans. This difference in perspectives translates easily into differences in viewing the Bologna process, especially in viewing its advantages and sometimes downplaying its potential dangers.

Therefore my concern about Bologna is rather that it is not trying to raise to conceptual level which would be required to help higher education systems in the Region with integrating
within the EHEA. My perspective is that the EHEA might be a good chance – a useful policy agenda – to help in reforming national higher education systems in the Region; it might provide clear recommendations what to do and how, presenting almost a blueprint for reforms, even though their scope would be quite different in different countries. In this respect, Bologna does not meet expectations of the academic world here, though; it is vague in its visions and unclear in its recommendations for actions, especially with respect to the Region. At the same time, which is understandable, there is no way to use it as a lever for external, additional funds for educational reforms. Although the success of the process is conditional on public funding of the project, it is obvious to many that no public funding will follow further steps in the process (“the Bologna reforms cannot be realised without additional funding” (Reichert and Tauch 2003: 29). So what can be done, where are recommendations for such a course of events?

**ON STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL REFORMS: TECTONIC SHIFTS VS. FINE-TUNING**

Today, there are crucial differences in thinking about reforms in Western Europe and in transition countries generally. Reforms to be undertaken in Western Europe are much more functional (fine-tuning, slight changes etc); reforms to be undertaken in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Balkans, by contrast, should be much more substantial (or structural). There is actually little common ground between the two sets of reforms except for technical details and the Bologna process in its official documents so far has not been able to draw a clear distinction between functional and structural reforms, and the regions of their future implementation. The differences between the condition of higher education systems in these parts of Europe are very substantial indeed; and so should be analyses, descriptions, and policy recommendations (to give an example: it is certainly very useful *in general* to introduce all over Europe a diploma supplement allowing potential employers to see the education track of their potential employees in detail; but what is its usefulness for the employers in labor markets where unemployment rate reaches, or exceeds, 50 per cent, as is the case in several Bologna countries of former Yugoslavia?). I got the feeling that reforms suggested by Bologna are perfect in every place of Europe in a sense they may not do much harm and possibly may help; but, at the same time, I am concerned that in the Region they may be of little help. Peter Rado draws a distinction between educational reforms in Western European and in Central and Eastern European countries. While in the former countries the reform is seen as a new wave of basically “organic process of change”, in the latter reform is considered to be “an almost complete systemic and structural change”; further differences include: genuine educational considerations vs. ideological and political considerations as drivers of reforms; external challenges to education partly predictable vs. high speed of transformations of economic and social environment; reform initiated because of concerns about student achievements and quality issues vs. educational reform is an “inherent component of the overall transition agenda”; avoidance of major structural changes vs. strong focus on structural issues; bottom-up support of reforms vs. top-down implementation of systemic changes; reform supported by an existing and extensive system of information (evaluation, assessment, research) and formal channels of bargaining and public discourse vs. basic conditions of informed and open policy making still need to be created (Rado 2001: 30). Rado never mentioned the Bologna process but his suggestions can be clearly used to see how Bologna is able to “work” in the West and in transition countries.

Problems and challenges, and consequently the depth of reforms required, are different; fine-tuning and relatively superficial adjustments undertaken within the Bologna process, perfectly
suitable for many Western institutions, without accompanying structural transformations in East and Central European institution may lead to merely theoretical or cosmetic changes while what is needed is the transformation of underlying structures of higher education systems, at least in some countries of the Region.

**FURTHER CONCERNS ABOUT BOLOGNA:**
**BETWEEN THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN SOCIETY**

My reaction to the Bologna process is mixed as I am torn between ideals and reality, or between how things should be and how they will most likely be. My concerns about Bologna are both general and specific and they refer to the process as a whole and to its potential impact in the Region. They are based on theoretical assumptions (especially the traditional “idea of the university”) but also on practical knowledge of functioning of higher education in many countries of the region. So they reflect the defense of the traditional social role and public responsibilities of the institution of the university but also, on the other hand, the defense of the practicality of the Bologna project. Some concerns I have derive from traditional notions of sovereignty of nation-states and sovereignty of their educational policies (see Enders 2002a), irreconcilable differences between educational systems deriving from different cultures, languages, traditions and inheritance from the past; but others derive from more technical and pragmatic understanding of the global picture of changes in higher education whose role is downplayed in Bologna. Some concerns are similar to those about the net effects of European Enlargement in 2004 but referred to higher education sector; others derive directly from the knowledge of budgetary situation of the public sector in the Region, and trends that have emerged there over the last decade or so (towards welfare state retrenchment rather than towards a “European Social Model” emphasized in the EU Lisbon Strategy).

Martin Carnoy draws a very useful distinction between the three factors that in practice are crucial to the approach governments take in educational reform and hence in educational responses to globalization:

Their **objective** financial situation, their **interpretation** of that situation, and their **ideological** position regarding the role of public sector in education. These three elements are expressed through the way that countries “structurally adjust” their economies to the new globalized environment (Carnoy 1999: 47).

Even though, as we emphasized here, the dimension of globalization challenges in higher education is certainly severely underestimated in Bologna documents, the phenomenon is one of underlying factors behind the wider Lisbon strategy of the European Union: its role is crucial for understanding the whole package of reforms, including those in the education and R&D sectors. It is interesting to refer the above distinction to transition countries involved in Bologna and make comparisons with EU-15. All the three parameters are drastically different: the objective financial situation does not require any statistical data, it may be taken for granted in the majority of transition countries; as a consequence of mostly objectively disastrous financial situation, the interpretations of the differences in objective financial situations may be even more dramatic; finally, in a number of transition countries escaping the model of command-driven economies, the ideological position regarding the role of the state in public sector differs considerably from the position taken, with few national exceptions, on a European level: the ideal of the state about to emerge once the chaos of the
transition period is over is the American model of cost-effectiveness and self-restraint rather than the “European social model” of the current EU-15. There are several determinants of this but certainly a general dissatisfaction with the inefficiency and incompetence of state bureaucratic bodies is one of them, another being the increased role of market mechanisms in public sector reforms already undertaken (ranging from healthcare to pension systems to decentralization of primary and secondary education) and the role of the private sector in economy in general. Again, the Bologna process seems unaware of, and uninterested in, these crucial differences. (To an extent, a medical metaphor for the dissemination mechanism reminded recently by Alberto Amaral and António Magalhaes might be useful here as well: education policy transfers are analogous to the spread of a disease with international experts acting analogously to “infectious agents moving from country to country looking for suitable hosts to be infected” (Amaral and Magalhaes: 2002: 3). Although the authors referred the problem in their “Epidemiology and the Bologna Saga” to the Bologna process, I believe this line of thinking might be even more adequately applied to the way some transition countries view the public sector and its services, agents in question being representatives of international and global development agencies (see also Tomusk 2002a; Sklair 2001).

To use another set of Carnoy’s distinctions – between “competitiveness-driven reforms”, “finance-driven reforms”, and “equity-driven reforms” in higher education (Carnoy 1999: 37; see also Carnoy 1995) – it is possible to argue that not only two speeds of reforms are necessary (as some reforms required are merely functional, and others are structural), but also the current drivers of reforms are different: while in the EU-15 it is competitiveness (decentralization, improved standards and management of educational resources, improved teacher recruitment and training), in at least some transition countries, by contrast, it is mostly the wish to change the “business climate”, to make use of structural adjustments and refer to the reduction of public spending on education (which results both from objective situation, its interpretation, and ideological stance governments take). Needless to say, these complications in the picture of “European” higher education systems are not evoked, and I believe they should be.

ON TRADITIONAL RHETORIC, PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS, SEARCH FOR TRUTH, AND KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY

I am also certainly disturbed by the potential bureaucratization of the process and by the potential transfer of power to take (some) decisions concerning higher education to some supranational European body; but at the same time I am also very much interested in using the opportunities provided by Bologna for rethinking – and hopefully reforming – inefficient, outmoded, sometimes and in some places corrupted, institutions which should really play central role in the new “knowledge economy” to come to the Region. I am very much concerned about the break with traditional tasks and roles of higher education institutions as evidenced by roles and tasks suggested for them by both Bologna and the ERA (as Jürgen Enders remarks, universities today are “rather vulnerable organizations that tend to be loaded with multiple expectations and growing demands about their role and functioning in our knowledge-driven societies”, Enders 2002b: 71). But on the other hand I am also aware to what extent the traditional rhetoric often covers institutional or professional interests rather than genuine love for search for truth, disinterested research and other traditional ideals of the university. I am mostly sharing Zygmunt Bauman’s conclusions about role of the university, though:
In this context, both European Research Area and European Higher Education Area provide some of them with new, increasingly clearly stated tasks. Which are certainly far away from traditional ones (see Rothblatt 1989, 1997; Jaspers 1959; Weber 1974).

I am worried about new vocabulary in which both higher education and research is cast in both EHEA and ERA initiatives; but at the same time, especially in connection with the ERA, I am fully aware that the vocabulary used, and concepts employed, are standard in current global discussions about higher education and research and development, from UNESCO to OECD to the World Bank. It is hard to use any other vocabulary today and be engaged in any meaningful contemporary debates on the future of higher education and research. It comes as no surprise at all even though it is hard to accept for me as a social and political philosopher attached to the “idea of the university” derived from German Idealists and Romantics.

I am also concerned about apparently economic account of the role of higher education in the ERA discussions. Although the ideals behind the EHEA are cast in a slightly different vocabulary, the message is similar: we need practical results from our institutions; universities will change and the kind of research they do as well as teaching they have in their offers will have to be changed, too; the responsibility of universities is no longer the search for truth in research and for moral and civic constitution (Bildung of the traditional German model of the university) of students/citizens in teaching; it is much more, if not exclusively, competitiveness, mobility, and employability for graduates; the responsibility of universities is towards economic growth of Europe as a whole, supporting knowledge-based economy, contributing to new skills for the new emerging workforce of the emerging competitive, global age. Let us remind again in this context the three goals of the Bologna process: enhancing the employability of European higher education graduates, promotion of mobility in higher education, and the attractiveness of the EHEA to the rest of the world (Reicher and Tauch 2003: 36-60). Driving values behind both the EHEA and the ERA, especially as they converge, are not only different from traditional values cherished by universities (which is obvious); they are also different from values debated in detail by a recent World Bank report on educational policies, Constructing Knowledge Societies: New Challenges for Tertiary Education, coordinated by Jamil Salmi. In the light of some previous Bank’s policy statements, especially with reference to the transition and developing countries, it comes as a surprise. The latest report certainly works in the wake of Higher Education. The Lessons of Experience of 1994 (also coordinated by Salmi) rather than in the wake of three other books concerned with education systems in these countries: Hidden Challenges to Education Systems in Transition Economies (World Bank 2000b), Education Sector Strategy (World Bank 1999), and a report of the UNESCO and World Bank’s Task Force on Higher Education and Society, Higher Education in Developing Countries. Peril and Promise (World Bank 2000a).

From a European perspective, the promotion of mobility in higher education is “clearly the most concrete, easily interpreted and uncontroversial” (Reichert and Tauch 2003: 39). I can agree with that in general but at least one reservation has to be raised: thinking of the Bologna
signatory countries (a group of EU-15 plus 10 candidate countries plus 10 “other” countries), what the direction of mobility is likely to be in the future? Certainly towards those most affluent, generally Western countries; thus from a national perspective, there are gains and losses of such increasing movement of the best talent available and for the “exporting” countries the issue is not going to be uncontroversial in the long run. Again, with no reference to the Bologna process, the World Bank reports rightly argues that the international mobility of skilled human resources will continue to present “long-term risks for tertiary investments in many nations” (World Bank 2002: 19). The intra-European mobility issue is uncontroversial in most affluent countries as the level of higher education there is very similar indeed and the incoming and outgoing mobility between them is balanced; but in the case of the least advanced higher education systems, and the poorest countries, increasing student mobility might become an easy escape route leading to permanent brain drain. This is not a theoretical issue: European Union is very much concerned about young researchers and PhD students leaving to the United States and (mostly) never coming back (OECD 2002, European Commission 2003c).

**COMPETITIVENESS AND SOCIAL AGENDAS, OR BETWEEN COMPETITION AND SOLIDARITY**

This brings us in turn to the critical issue of the bi-polar character of the Bologna process: it derives from the ideas of both cooperation (or solidarity) and competition. *Trends III* report is very explicit about that while acknowledging that the initiation of the Bologna process has to do with “a sense of threatened competitiveness vis-à-vis prime competitors like the US, rather than from sheer enthusiasm for the increasing intensity of cooperation within European higher education” (Reichert and Tauch 2003: 52). From my perspective, it is equally important to remember about a play of interests within the emergent EHEA, and the competition among European higher education institutions. Some countries are already global players in higher education; some are already exporters of higher education to Central and Eastern Europe in various, but mostly highly lucrative disciplines. It is hard to believe in the competitive spirit presented to the non-European global competitors and the solidarity spirit presented at the same time to the (Central or other) European partners. Can we imagine cooperation and solidarity as driving motives in contacts with the countries of the Region on the part of institutions from the countries with strong market tradition and good share in global educational market (like e.g. UK or the Netherlands)? My guess is that the motive of cooperation may be stronger in the Region, with growing competition motives in Western Europe. Finally, within national systems and between national institutions, the competition motive is bound to be on the rise, proportionately to the increasing competition for national public funds. Commenting briefly on “ambivalent Bologna”, *Trends III* notes two potentially conflicting agendas: the “competitiveness agenda” and the “social agenda”, and rightly concludes, without much further discussion: “it would be naïve to assume that the EHEA is being built only on the latter agenda” (Reichert and Tauch 2003: 149). In the case of the region, unfortunately, it is the cooperation and solidarity motives as well as the social agenda that really count; it would be naïve to assume that we are competing here with the US and Japan…
ON PRESERVING TRADITIONAL ROLES OF HIGHER EDUCATION, OR HOW TO SAVE ITS SOUL

While ERA communiqués generally underlie the need for investment in research and development, somehow downplaying the role of university as a traditional locus of research, the World Bank report emphasizes the investment in tertiary education. The emphasis results from the cost-benefit analysis and takes the following form: “the cost of insufficient investment in tertiary education can be very high. These costs can include reduced ability of a country to compete effectively in global and regional economies; a widening of economic and social disparities; declines in the quality of life, in health status, and in life expectancy; an increase in unavoidable public expenditures on social welfare programs; and a deterioration of social cohesion” (World Bank 2002: xxiii). Interestingly enough, recent World Bank policy reports tend to stress those dimensions of the functioning of universities which are mostly neglected by EHEA documents: democratic values (World Bank 2000a: 44), core values for responsible citizens in “complex democratic societies”, the promotion of “civic behaviors, nation-building, and social cohesion” and finally a very significant dimension of “social mobility”. Among public social benefits of higher education are also trust in social institutions, democratic participation and open debate, and appreciation of diversity in gender, ethnicity, religion and social class (World Bank 2002: 31, 32, 77). Paradoxically, whenever “mobility” is evoked in the Bologna process, it is student mobility across the continent rather than the traditional upward mobility across social strata based on education and learning. It is also interesting to remind that the role of social inclusion and exclusion (a very European terminology which was applied to describing educational purposes by the EU in recent years) did not find its way to the purposes of higher education within the Bologna process. What seemed to some as a possible “new framing for education” (Henry et al. 2001), accompanied by growing interest in the participation in civil society as a goal of education, have not entered the Bologna vocabulary.

Frank Newman in his “Saving Higher Education’s Soul” distinguishes between three attributes essential to preserving higher education’s role as servant to the needs of society: 1) socializing students to their role in society, 2) providing all citizens with social mobility, and 3) upholding the university as the home of disinterested scholarship and unfettered debate (Newman 2000: 3). The first function of a university, the socialization of young people to their roles in society, can be divided into three types: socialization to the community, socialization to the intellectual life, and socialization to the profession (Newman 2000: 4). Socialization to the community means preparation for civic engagement or democratic participation – preparation for the participation in the community as citizens of a democracy. As traditional universities are becoming increasingly market-oriented and are running an increasing number of for-profit activities, they may play down the role of activities not directly related to workforce skills. Especially if the higher education setting becomes highly competitive. The second type of socialization of students, socialization to the intellectual life, consists in introducing students to intellectual concepts and giving them the ability to think critically (philosophy, history, literature etc.). Finally, the third type of socialization of students, is the socialization to the profession. The second function of the university in Newman’s typology is encouraging social mobility. Higher education plays a key role in determining the opportunities for upward mobility; “today, more than ever before, it is access to higher education that determines who participates fully in society” (Newman 2000: 10). Finally, the third function of the university is providing a safe place for disinterested scholarship and unfettered debate. From this traditional perspective – presented by an eminent student of global
and market forces in education! – the Bologna process is missing major points and may not be able to “save higher education’s soul”.

I mentioned both World Bank and the “Futures Project” to show that even in a more global and Americanized contexts, there is still quite a lot of space for maneuver, at least on declaratory level, to sustain traditional values and roles for higher education institutions. I cannot see these dimensions sufficiently developed in the Bologna process so far, although the Berlin Communiqué contains a formulation about the importance of the social dimension of the process (but does not go beyond the idea that “higher education is a public good and a public responsibility” (Berlin Communiqué 2003: 1). The context is much more institution-oriented (funding) than student-oriented (future citizens of democratic societies).

**THE GAP IS GETTING WIDER,**
**OR ON THE ABSENCE OF THE TRANSITION DIMENSION**

I am also very much concerned about the point of arrival of the “harmonisation” of (not only!) the “architecture” of European higher education, even though I know that the point of departure depicted in the Sorbonne Declaration in 1998 is relatively innocent (and it is extremely useful to read documentation of the EU project on “Tuning Educational Structures in Europe” and trace its driving motives from this perspective, especially that, as *Trends III* formulates it, it is the only European project that “give[s] concrete meaning to the Bologna reforms in various academic disciplines” (Reichert and Tauch 2003: 24). I am certainly disturbed by the development of “European core curricula”, common “European Qualifications Framework”, a “European Book of Competencies” etc. I am hesitant about the outcome of an “overarching qualification framework for the EHEA, with a view to providing a framework against which national frameworks could articulate”, as recommended by Danish Bologna seminar, as well as about the development of “truly Joint European Degrees in the sense of *supranational degrees*” (Reichert and Tauch 2003: 74, 81, emphasis mine). These issues require separate attention, and I am not going to develop this theme here.

But finally, I am concerned about the potential use of the Bologna process in the Region compared with its use in Western Europe. I am very much afraid that while Bologna may be quite successful in promoting its agenda in Western Europe (especially combined with funding and resources already available and additional incentives already included in the implementation of the European Research Area), it may fail in the transition countries. That would mean that the gap between the two would be getting even wider than it currently is. While, I believe, Western European institutions are much more afraid of losing their autonomy, freedom to teach and do research in the way their national priorities and funding allocations still lavishly allow them to do, for institutions in transition countries Bologna might be the last coherent reform agenda if it was further developed to include this purpose. So far, unfortunately, the “transition” dimension is largely absent from it, both on the level of analysis and that of policy recommendations, not to mention the issue how to finance the process. I wish that dimension would be developed in the future so that the transition countries could use the Bologna process for their benefit and the gap might finally at least stop getting wider.

I am wondering whether the following remark (made by Thomas L. Friedman in his *Lexus and the Olive Tree*) about globalization could not be referred to the European Higher Education Area in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe: “I didn’t start globalization, I can’t stop it – except at a huge cost to human development – and I’m not going to waste time
trying. All I want to think about is how I can get the best out of this new system, and cushion the worst, for the most people” (Friedman 1999: xviii). Thus the question for us here could be reframed as follows: how can we get the best of the Bologna process, and cushion the worst, for the most people in the Region.
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